FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1950, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, VOLUME V
777.00/8–750
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)1
secret
[Washington,] August 7, 1950.
Subject: Ethiopian Views on Eritrea.
Participants: |
Ato Abte-Wold Aklilou, Foreign Minister of Ethiopia |
Mr. John Spenser, Adviser to the Ethiopian Foreign Minister |
|
Assistant Secretary McGhee |
|
Mr. Elmer H. Bourgerie—AF |
|
Mr. S. K. C. Kopper—AF |
Foreign Minister Aklilou, accompanied by Mr. John Spenser, called on me today at his own request. After an exchange of amenities, I expressed my appreciation for the letter which I recently received from the Emperor (this letter dealt with Ethiopia’s desire to obtain certain airplanes).2 The Ethiopian Foreign Minister replied that the Emperor appreciated very much the assistance which the United States had been giving Ethiopia in its efforts to obtain suitable military planes. Foreign Minister Aklilou also referred to my trip to Addis last spring in gracious terms.
The Ethiopian Foreign Minister then spoke along the following lines concerning the problem of Eritrea: the Ethiopian Government appreciated the help which the American delegation had given to Ethiopia in the past. He said that Emperor Haile Selassie had appreciated Dr. Jessup’s assistance on the federation problem which [Page 1664]the Emperor knew was designed to help Ethiopia, even though the Emperor was not at all enthusiastic about federation. The Emperor was disposed to accept the federation proposal made by Dr. Jessup principally because the United States had made the proposal and the Emperor had great faith in United States judgment. Unfortunately, a decision of the Italian Cabinet had caused the defeat of the federation proposal last fall.
Continuing, Foreign Minister Aklilou stated that four things have happened since last fall:
1.
The General Assembly action giving Italy a trusteeship over Italian Somaliland had deeply shocked the Emperor and the Ethiopian population. They found it exceedingly difficult to understand why Italy should have had her desires met while Ethiopia had to wait. Nevertheless, Ethiopia had made every effort not to have any incidents break out along the Ethiopia–Somaliland border.
2.
There had been a large growth of the Unionist Party in Eritrea. This had been caused by several factors: (a) the activities of the Italians, (b) the difficulties of some of the Eritreans regarding the acceptance of union with Ethiopia had been worked out, and (c) the Independent Party had been disintegrating while the Unionist Party had been gaining strength.
3.
The report of the UN Commission was a new factor. A majority of this Commission was in favor of closer association between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Emperor was quite surprised when he heard that the federation proposal was already being discussed in New York because when the federation proposal was discussed in New York last year, there had not been a UN report which recommended closer association between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Now there was.
4.
Whereas there had never been a clearcut majority in favor of closer union between Eritrea and Ethiopia, it was now evident that only a small minority favored independence and that a majority did favor union.
Foreign Minister Aklilou said he had explained to the Emperor that the United States and the United Kingdom were talking about federation now because of the difficulties which would be incurred in the UN in efforts to obtain the desired Ethiopian position of union. The Emperor had consented to Aklilou’s discussing federation because of the Emperor’s respect for the judgment of the United States and the United Kingdom.
Aklilou felt that when discussing federation all of us should know exactly what we were talking about. During the London conversations in June the Italians did not wish to discuss details although he, Aklilou, desired to do so. As a result, it was necessary to start all over again when he reached New York. He then repeated that the Emperor was most grateful for United States support. The Foreign Minister said that he wanted no misunderstanding on this point. [Page 1665]Ethiopia is grateful for the work which the United States and the United Kingdom have put into the draft resolution now being discussed in New York without committing ourselves. He said this was very helpful. He had cabled this draft back to Ethiopia and he was now happy to inform us in confidence that the Emperor had consented to discuss federation on the basis of the paper.3
The Foreign Minister then said that, speaking personally and confidentially, he was concerned about the prestige of the Emperor as [Page 1666]regards Eritrea. Many of the peoples in Eritrea had been clamoring for complete union with Ethiopia. It would be difficult for the Emperor to explain to them why federation should be accepted. Aklilou said that there was a lack of understanding as to what federation meant; one thing was definite however: the period of transition should be short and absolutely definite. Aklilou said he was willing to do everything possible to help out in the work in the Interim Committee. If no desirable solution came out, Ethiopia would have no choice but to go back to union. He said the Emperor was somewhat disappointed at the intransigent attitude of the Italians. Aklilou referred to a telegram which he understood the Italian delegation had received from Prime Minister De Gasperi instructing the Italian delegation to take a strong line against close federation. Aklilou said that if Ethiopia had to go back to the position of annexation of Eritrea, she would ask the United States to support her in her opposition to an unacceptable solution. Ethiopia would also ask the United States to support an arrangement along the lines adopted in Somaliland, i.e., a long term Ethiopian trusteeship over Eritrea. Aklilou concluded by saying that no solution would be disastrous.
I replied along the following lines. We appreciated very much the full explanation which Foreign Minister Aklilou had given us regarding the Ethiopian position. I assured him that we would abide by our understanding with the Ethiopian Government. We were doing everything possible to get a solution adopted by the UN which could be acceptable to Ethiopia. We desired to have it settled quickly in such a manner that it would work. We would keep in confidence the fact that the Emperor had consented to discuss federation on the basis of the US–UK draft. Our delegation in New York had our full confidence and they would be more than willing to discuss any details. Italy seems to have receded. Because of this, it did not seem that Ethiopia had lost any bargaining power. Aklilou then interjected that although Italy had declared that she had no interest in Eritrea, she was certainly acting in a contrary fashion. I resumed by saying that any concessions that Ethiopia might make should be considered as concessions to the UN and not to Italy. I expressed the hope that Ethiopia would be willing to make minor concessions, if necessary, in order to satisfy all members of UN. We were encouraged by the reports of progress from the U.S. delegation in New York. As regards citizenship, I said that citizenship of the people living in Eritrea would have to be considered Ethiopian. In addition, we believe that national defense should be controlled by the federal government, but that Eritreans might desire to have a local police force. We appreciated the forbearance of Ethiopia with regard to Italian Somaliland. [Page 1667]Foreign Minister Aklilou said that as far as policing was concerned, considerable international responsibility would fall upon Ethiopia on such questions as protection of minorities. He added that the Independence bloc have said that they would have no Italians in the Government. This might cause some difficulty. I said that these were all questions of give and take which would have to be worked out as time goes on. I assured him that we would continue to support a workable and acceptable solution.
George C. McGhee
↩https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v05/d899