Where
are the Dots to be Connected Here?
Nebarai
Keshi
October
11, 2003
Note: First, it should be noted that the
Woyane regime declared the peace settlement reached between Eritrea and Ethiopia
in December 2000 null and void. In a letter sent to UN, Meles Zenawi said
Ethiopia won’t abide by the “final and binding” provision, and that unless an
“alternative mechanism” is set up by the UN to his satisfaction, his government
has no option but to resort to force and violence against Eritrea and its
people. Once again, Eritrea’s sovereignty and independence is in grave danger.
In fact, Woyane never accepted the peace settlement from day one. What is
different now is that the government of Meles Zenawi made it public. In the
midst of rejection and defiance of Woyane, the ELF-RC and the so-called ENA
continue to remain silent. In a manner that defies reason and conscience, they
keep on professing democracy, Eritrea, justice…etc as opposed to registering
strong protest and condemnation of Woyane regime. This complete inaction, in the
face of Woyane’s flagrant rejection of the peace settlement, only carries a
great testimony to the maneuvers and deep partnership they have with Woyane
Tigray. It goes without saying; their obsession with power has become a
liability and curse to Eritrea, which continues to be played into the hands of
Woyane. Over the last five years they sang Woyane’s song despite strong
condemnation from their own people. Now, I am afraid they are repeating it
again. The alliance leaders with strong ties to our lethal enemy, with
prevailing schism amongst themselves, and with no clue what is at stake can’t
cry for democracy and share of power in Eritrea; they aren’t listening to the
power of reason. At this juncture there is nothing important, but to rise to the
challenge and defend the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of
our nation regardless of political differences. If any opposition is to bear
fruit, we as people and nation have to stand to the obvious – defend our
country. The country doesn’t exist to the exclusion of its sovereignty and
independence.
Last
August, Woldeyesus Ammar, the leading ideologue/figure of ELF-RC, a strong ally
of the chairman side, and a proponent of restructuring and revamping the
so-called Eritrean National Alliance from bottom up presented an interesting
piece titled “religion and ethnicity in Eritrean politics”. Also,
Ammar is accused of engineering the entire ELF-RC crisis by introducing
leadership reform in the organization. Ammar is reported to have campaigned
relentlessly against Nassir long before the 2nd session of the RC (Agust 2002),
in which Suim was finally ascended to the chairmanship position. In addition,
Ammar is believed to have pioneered this leadership reform mainly to replace the
“old guard”, Ahmed Nassir by a “new guard”, Suim Ogubamichael. But some members
of his organization dismissed the change of chairmanship as no reform, pure
politics, isolationist, and a cause of upsetting the long held norm and
tradition of power distribution in ELF-RC. Also, another critic views the change
of the leadership as nothing, but a replacement of one old guard by another new
old guard (both Suim and Nassir belong to the same old guard generation), in
which Wocho integlbetkayo is Wocho sort of analogy. Finally, Ammar
is accused to have employed religious tactics to the exclusion of Moslem ELF-RC
leaders in an effort to bring Suim to the position of chairmanship. This brings
us to the crisis at hand, and that is whether the cause of the split is limited
to chairmanship change or to the pullout from the Alliance camp or to the
alleged religion and ethnic practices that may have contributed to the final
break up of ELF-RC into two groups.
In my view, Ammar’s “religion and ethnicity
in Eritrean politics” series (part 1,2,3) comprises two parts. The first part is
essentially a historical account that goes back to the 60s and 70s in search of
mistakes and practices allegedly committed in the name of religion and
ethnicity. I have less concern with the first part, but in all fairness
establishing some questions is in order before I move on to the second part,
which deals with multiple issues starting from the current split of ELF-RC to
ENA, and to many other controversial items. First, it takes a great deal of
extensive and thorough research to pinpoint where exactly Eritreans went wrong
if we did when it comes to practicing religion and ethnicity in our national
politics. Second, in handling an agenda as big as “religion and ethnicity”, one
can’t cut short and present own depiction for some political ends. Nor would it
be considered conclusive findings if events/developments aren’t presented and
analyzed on basis of the context in which they occur. I don’t see those elements
included on Ammar’s presentation. Rather, his presentation is full of
distractions and willful distortions, which can be easily contested from a
number of angles. I would have considered it educational and constructive
contribution if it had been based on reason rather than on method of political
madness.
For example, Ammar didn’t hide his critical
stand against every political group he disapproves and distrusts, but he left
out our old ELF from the equation and even absolved it from all the past wrongs
and sins it committed. This is troubling. I found it extremely difficult to
settle with his claim. The bottom line is, history isn’t about producing
selective outcomes; nor is it about steering facts. It is about verifiable
accounts that changed a given course of events in the past. And I would say all
factors surrounding the subject in question must be weighed, presented, and
researched. No history can be erased at the stroke of a pen.
Overall, Ammar’s argument on “religion
and ethnicity in Eritrean politics” lacks objective and impartial account on the
subject in question. It disproportionately hails and credits one side while
aggressively blames and puts at fault another side. For example, Ammar accused president
Isayas Afeworki as the “top polarizer” and inventor of the “Nhanan Elamanan”
manifesto authored in the 70s, in which some still wrongly view it as a leading
vision upon which Hizbawi Hailtat was established as a splinter group.
Nevertheless, incriminating the current president of Eritrea for political
expediency is fine with me as long as it addresses the root cause of the
“religion and ethnicity in Eritrean politics”. But it doesn’t because Ammar’s
approach isn’t a true representative of the entire picture of the alleged
practices and causes of the “religion and ethnicity in Eritrean politics” during
and after the armed struggle for independence. Ammar didn’t even remotely
attempt to refer to the circumstances under which Hizbawi Hailtat
(Popular Liberation Forces, PLF) was forced to split in the 70s. How cynical,
irresponsible, and political can you be? Nonetheless, even if for the sake of
argument, one assumes what Ammar says about the president, Shaebia, and the rest
is true, it still raises and opens a myriad of historical questions unanswered.
In order to have a sort of historical fact sheet on “religion and ethnicity in
Eritrean politics”, one needs to include certain critical questions and
developments into the whole picture:
·
What was the
level of religion and ethnic harmony within ELF prior to the period leading to
the formation of Popular Liberation Forces (PLF) in 1970/71? Hizbawi Hailtat
Eritra was a union entered into by three groups, namely Sabbe’s group, Isayas’
group, and Ubelin group in the 1970s. Ubelin were minority in that union because
shortly before the formation of PLF, ELF units ambushed Ubelin in Ila
Sada and almost wiped out the whole group.
·
What started
the popular “reform movement” of ELF grassroots in 1965? Wasn’t
the movement, among other things, against religion and ethnic polarization? Did
it succeed?
·
What was the
negative effect/influence of zonal policy “zemene kifltat, ayam
menatik” on religion, ethnicity, and highlander/lowlander? Didn’t some
ELF leaders start polarizing and Balkanizing everything in the early years of
the struggle? Do we know the ramification of the zonal policy on religion and
ethnicity in the present Eritrea’s politics?
·
Does the
“religion and ethnicity” politics apply to ELF in any form or shape? For
example, ELF liquidated the democratic movement of 1977 after it dubbed it
“Fulul, Kedi Bethek” anarchist and lawbreaker. How could you
arrest, exile, and liquidate thousands and thousands of freedom fighters on
pretext of organizational centralism?
This is very simplistic view of the entire situation. Why would an
organization’s ‘centralism’ be considered of any thing if it doesn’t serve the
purpose of the whole community?
·
What about the
declaration of war on the alleged Yemanwi kinfi (right wing) in
1978 in Dankalia, in which many unsung patriots such as Omer Suba were
killed and liquidated by special ELF units. When do you declare religion and
ethnic polarization? How much selective can you be? Isn’t liquidation one major
form of polarizing Eritrean society?
·
What about the
era of the infamous policy of ayam tesfia (the era of purging) declared by
ELF in the 1970s to eliminate the then newly born Hizbawi Hailtat (PLF)?
Isn’t “purging” the worst form of political and social polarization? Isn’t
purging a process of getting rid of groups (perhaps minority) who hold different
opinion than yours? Isn’t this basically anti democratic measures? Isn’t this
measure anti unity of Eritrean people?
·
What about
ELF’s declaration of war on Sabbe’s group in 1979? Sabbe and his
group were pushed out of Eritrean field following ELF’s well-organized military
attack on his forces in places such as Hashenit and
Homib. In fact, martyr Saeed Salih, one of the then leading
military strategists in ELF, organized the attack. Do we know how many young
Eritreans perished in this bloody civil war? Isn’t this ELF’s hostile and
long-established policy of elimination, alienation and domination of other
Eritrean political forces? Haven’t these policies badly damaged and polarized
the unity of Eritrean people?
·
What about the
bloody coup d’etat carried out by none other than the notorious Abdella Idris in
Rasai in 1982? Isn’t this act of betrayal and violent takeover a
form of polarization? However, despite the violent takeover, ELF-RC embraced
Abdella Idris. What a double standard political culture.
The truth is none other than the former and
some current ELF leaders themselves introduced “religion and ethnicity politics
in Eritrea”. In fact, the practice of religion and ethnicity may have reached
its worst form perhaps before the actual birth of Hizbawi Hailtat (PLF) in the
70s. The birth of Hizbawi Hailtat in the 70s became imminent only after ELF
leaders failed to lead and declared a policy of liquidation, domination, and
purging every group that peacefully opposed and democratically questioned the
then leadership or had a different approach to the armed struggle. In fact, this
era is best remembered in our history as the most destructive and divisive one:
“Eritrea can’t and won’t accommodate more than one organization/front was
the motto of ELF leaders.” Historically, one can’t be oblivious of the
“religion and ethnic polarization” and the rest of the political turmoil that
ravaged ELF during the first decade of the armed struggle. Forget about the
“top polarizer” allegation for a second if you will, and talk
about the many “chief polarizers” who ruined ELF from top to
bottom and made a career out of it. The point is bending and squeezing
historical facts to promote one’s political ambition only denies Eritrean people
the right to know their own history. It is not right to subject Eritrean people
to such twisted, opinionated, and widely unrepresentative historical facts. I
believe we need to go back to square one and produce objective, unbiased, and
helpful research on the subject of “religion and ethnicity in Eritrean politics”
with the sole purpose of mitigating those differences. What is also crucial to
understand here is whether the assertion and justification presented by Ammar on
“religion and ethnicity in Ertirean politics” as a whole constitute a common
cure. In my opinion, no it doesn’t. In fact, if the whole exercise of Ammar was
intended to mend the fences and alleviate the alleged problem, he hasn’t done
so. In the contrary, Ammar may have worsened it by presenting nothing of
substance, but questionable, inaccurate, and slanted historical account on
“religion and ethnicity in Eritrean politics.”
Remember, each of these purging and
liquidation policies (directed at Hizbawi Hailtat, PLF in the 1970s, or at
the alleged Falul in 1977, or at the right wing in 1978, or at the Sabbe forces
in 1979) by ELF leaders over the years brought one thing: and
that is ELF’s own destruction and disintegration. The bottom line is, it is fine
to learn and draw some lessons from our past history. But the single biggest
mistake is the propensity and inclination to dwell on it (promotion of political
schism); it is the unrelenting efforts to apply our past to the current
political reality of Eritrea (method of scoring points and stifling democracy).
Listen, the era of armed struggle is over; it is history. Let’s leave this for
historians and social researchers to grapple with. The central tenet of any
would-be opposition should focus on embodying contemporary legal and peaceful
instruments to effect change in Eritrea. What we Eritreans need is bigger ideas,
not guns and violence; secular constitutional parties, not extremists and
subversive groups; and politically matured leaders (not with pay back attitude),
not with a frame of minds of 60s, 70s, and 80s. We can’t think, speak, and act
according to 60s, 70s, and 80s. We need to take off our old hats. Finally,
nothing is important, but the Ertirean people’s history. And if you want to
write people’s history, you better do it right. One shouldn’t risk the relevance
of their character and political reputation by presenting skewed account of our
history. There are many watchful eyes in Eritrea. No body monopolizes the
people’s history.
The
second part of the presentation is intended to put some perspective on the
current state of affairs of the opposition (ENA vs. the split of ELF-RC). It is
encouraging. But the timing and motive behind Ammar’s analysis is highly
questionable; not only is it questionable but the substance of it is also
largely embellished.
It
seems Ammar is occupied in this latest discussion/analysis on
Eritrea's religion and ethnicity, simply because ELF-RC lost one of its wings to
Ahmed and Dr. Beyene. Hence, one aspect of his discussion seems to justify the
long anticipated break up by way of blaming and accusing the Nassir side;
and the second aspect seems to blame the elements (religion and ethnicity) that
allegedly led to the break up of ELF-RC. My point is neither claim establishes
justifiable evidence at this particular time. The present crisis of ELF-RC is
not uncommon in ELF’s history. For example, “Sagim” broke up more than two times:
Zemhret Yohannes and Totil group who joined EPLF; Abdella Mahmoud who formed his
own splinter group (ERDF); and Tewolde Gebreslassie who remained with the old
Sagim now known as (EPDLF). The same story goes with the old EDM and others. The
analogy of “Sagim and EDM” may not perfectly fit the present crisis of ELF-RC.
But there is one common identifiable political culture found on all ELF groups,
and that is they hardly fight over big principles and objectives. Yet they keep
splitting and disagreeing. It seems failure is the mark of their political
career. It is a legacy, in which dialogue and compromise are not known in their
political vocabulary. They are good at crisis arrangement.
The
truth is the break up became inescapable in ELF-RC because the leadership wasn't
coherent enough in its vision; the split took place because ELF-RC
leadership wasn't collective, visionary, and democratic enough to handle its
political and organizational crisis before they hit hard (failed to put its
house in order); the divorce became inevitable because power distribution had
remained all along amongst the same breed of people, the 60s, the 70s, the 80s.
No new blood; and above all the separation became unavoidable because ELF-RC
leadership had wrongly and cynically entered into an Alliance of tribalists,
opportunists, fanatics, and ethnic federalists; it was a costly strategic
mistake, but also it could have been avoided if the ELF-RC leadership had
calculated the risks and consequences involved in joining the Alliance camp back
in March 1999. Worst of all, ELF-RC
entered into an Alliance, which is fully supported, financed, and monitored by
none other than the lethal enemy of Eritrean people, the Woyane regime.
Hence,
ELF-RC became part of a national problem by blindly joining the Alliance
instead of pioneering the democratic and secular forces and articulating its
differences with the current government of Eritrea. This Alliance was never set
out to become a real national opposition force. There may be more to it beneath
the surface, but the claim of religion and ethnicity hardly constitute a
legitimate argument in the overall crisis that led to the break up of ELF-RC. I
may be wrong. Here, I am not disputing the politics of religion and
ethnicity that we have in the Alliance camp. Yes we do have many of them. But
the new splinter led by Nassir and Dr. Beyene can’t be categorized as religious
or ethnically driven group. I haven’t seen any evidence that supports those
claims. We have to wait and see. Certainly, one can establish strong opposition
over its leading vision and conviction. One can question the circumstances under
which the group presented its case in defense of the split. But above all, one
can question the alternative (mode of struggle as they call it)
road the group chose, and the decision it took to rejoin an imaginary Alliance.
But labeling them as “ethnic groupies” is oddly disturbing political statement.
How are they more “ethnic groupies” than the chairman side? On a serious note,
the name Ahmed Nassir is very recognizable name in ELF. Ahmed Nassir spent many
years in the leadership circle (most of the time holding the top position). With
no doubt, one can produce a long list of leadership failures and weaknesses of
Ahmed Nassir, but religion and ethnicity isn’t one among the list. I don’t see
the linkage between ethnicity and the split here. Without delving into details,
the accusation and counter accusation between the two sides continues unabated.
What is the point? These leaders have increasingly become reckless, which leads
one to believe that they can’t be entrusted with the task of running a nation,
or becoming a formidable and peaceful opposition to the GoE. These leaders seem
to continue on committing grave mistakes over and over
again.
Another
interesting and plausible argument in Ammar’s piece is "the failure of the
new opposition that mushroomed after the end of the bloody conflict with
Ethiopia. The second major setback was the failure of the Alliance to
restructure its own house so that it could go a higher step towards
consolidating the increasing number of opponents to the regime." The
other problem argued by Ammar is the Alliance’s "dependence on friends",
and the manipulation of the "charter", which
resulted in bringing the Hiruys and Abdellas to the forefront, as Ammar put
it, “a leadership chosen for it." See (http://www.awate.com/artman/publish/printer_1988.shtml).
I do agree with Ammar on those well-articulated assessments. But this isn't the
whole story. Ammar limited his discussion; further wittingly or unwittingly he
focused mainly on the final outcome of the Oct. 2002 Adis Ababa conference.
Ammar, I believe, didn’t tell his readers how the initial relationship of the
various (13 or 14) groups and individuals in the Alliance came about into
existence prior to the Adis Ababa conference. Moreover, why the Alliance failed
and became unappealing body to the majority of Eritrean people. How did the role
and influence of Woyane Tigray play into the myriad of crisis after crisis seen
in the Alliance Camp? Plain and simple, if it weren’t for the war, this Alliance
wouldn’t have been established. We know it because prior to March 1999 (eighteen
or so years to their creation), no unity or any of those sorts were remotely
possible. Hence, from the outset the foundation was built on a very shaky
political ground.
Evidently,
the problem of ELF-RC is wider and deeper than the politics of Adis Ababa
conference or the inclusion of articles 3 and 4 (where Ammar’s group seem to
have a strong opinion and opposition) in the ENA platform. Nor is it only
limited to the foreign involvement. It is the overall integrity and management
of "the opposition strategy"; it is the conflicting and incompatible visions
(irreconcilable); it is the type of people and the implacably hostile groups
ELF-RC was dealing with; it is the absence of a well-founded and appealing
national programs, and above all it is the failure of not looking for other
strategic alternatives beyond a handful individuals and groups clustered around
a shallow, unfaithful, disruptive, and splintery union. You know, five years
into the formation of this Woyane led Alliance, the Alliance leaders couldn’t
woke up to reality and recognize the grave mistakes they are committing against
the motherland.
To me the major strategic flaws and
drawbacks can be summed up as follows:
Ammar’s
reference to Aboy Ibrahim Sultan's speech is correct. Aboy Ibrahim preached,
argued, and stood against all types of religious and political schisms
because he was a visionary man. However, I believe it is convoluted
interpretation to blame Shaebia/GoE for the deterioration of the Alliance,
or for the rapid multiplication of the sectarian elements we have in the
Alliance. We know this violent and dangerous culture began in the 80s or before
with the aim of installing an Islamic state in Eritrea. It is safe to say they
could have existed even if ELF-RC had assumed power in Eritrea. We also know
these fanatic groups are part of a wider Islamic fundamentalist movement -
tearing apart peaceful communities throughout the world: Sudan,
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Sudan, Philippines, Algeria, and even the
Western countries to mention a few. The fact is even with the latest change of
acronym from EIJM to ERIM (Reform instead of Jihad), the substance
and message remains vividly the same. No amount of political correctness can
change their (Islamic state of Eritrea) ideology.
Second,
Ammar accused Eritrean “Moslem elites” of becoming part of the problem (helping
the fanatics). This is a concocted claim. “It is my personal conclusion
that many members of Eritrean Moslem elite who always played highly patriotic
role in the past are not doing the same today. Probably out of impatience with
the regime and the society in general, they are becoming, and some have already
become, part of the danger. The trend has been building up since 1980s and is
today coming closer to a highly dangerous phase”, complained
Ammar. Please click on the following link. (http://www.awate.com/artman/publish/printer_1988.shtml)
The message is carefully crafted to instill fear and suspicion in the public
mind. First, who are the “Moslem elites” whom Ammar is referring to? Do we have
“Moslem elites’” association that can be truly identified with a particular
political or religious interest in Eritrea? I am not aware of it. In reality,
Eritrean “Moslem elites are like any other Eritrean elites scattered across the
political spectrum of Eritrea; they don’t share the same political view. I don’t
know why this specific message is being directed at them. However, as deceptive
and misguided argument as it is, implicit in this message is the assumption that
Eritrean Moslem elites (influential people, professionals, intellectuals,
experts) are collectively opposed to the current GoE. This is blatantly
misleading to portray Eritrean “Moslem elites” as advocates and defenders of
fanatic clerics on one hand, and anti GoE on the other hand. In my opinion, the
argument doesn’t lend any credence to the factual role Eritrean Moslem elites
are playing in their national politics. It is a cheap shot to try to damage the
good reputation of hundreds of Eritrean experts because they belong to one faith
or another.
Third,
Ammar’s unrelenting stand against the GoE (EPLF/PFJD) is a well-established
fact. I am not here to defend Shaebia. But my question to Ammar is what role
have the secularists played to prevent the ethnic and religious polarization in
the Alliance itself? The danger was real, but the ELF-RC and other secularists
have either intentionally embraced it or easily underestimated the danger. They
saw them as partners in opposition while people with great minds warned of the
violent culture of these fanatics. Yet the ELF-RC and others came to their
defense; they presented them as legitimate and peaceful groups established to
reverse EPLF’s/GoE’s alleged injustices and marginalization of Eritrean Moslems.
The claim by itself is disingenuous, preposterous, and cynical purely designed
to mislead the public. Again, placing the blame on GoE is nothing, but a
political duplicity and fear of facing the reality. Why play the card of
Shaebia? Why cry foul? Why didn’t you establish a functional opposition party
and fix the problem? What prevents you from doing just that? Yet, unlike other
apologists and backers of the ENA, Ammar to some degree recognizes the danger
inherently associated with these groups. I commend him for
that.
Last,
those of you (ELF-RC) and others who supposedly advocate for secular
visions lost and easily caved in to the demands of the fanatic clerics and left
extremists over the last five years in the Alliance gatherings. The inclusion of
articles 3 and 4 in the Alliance charter, among other things, is a clear defeat
to the secularists. Don't get me wrong here; I do support freedom of religion,
but not as state machinery. My point is ELF-RC could have disassociated itself
from the Alliance and TPLF a long time ago, or at least made its case
collectively clear to the public when it pulled out in Oct. 2002. ELF-RC
could have been redeemed. In fact, Eritrea is known for embracing its own
disgruntled children. But ELF-RC became a victim of its own. First, while it had
a relatively commanding political and organization presence in the Alliance, it
missed the opportunity and failed to stand tall when Woyane unleashed a naked
aggression against Eritrea and its people, an aggression, which brought
unspeakable and unmatched destruction to our country. This alone left a big dent
on ELF-RC as an organization: membership of the organization sharply shrunk,
trust went down to the drain, principles compromised, direction shifted and
lost, and crisis after crisis emerged. Second, when opportunity finally knocked
its door (the Addis Ababa conference), it again failed to stand in one voice –
Himak Insihab disorganized retreat one might
add.
Now, putting all the contentious politics
aside, Ammar’s discussion could have been focused more on whether ELF-RC made a
strategic and policy mistake in joining the Alliance in March 1999. Are there
things ELF-RC could have done differently? Could ELF-RC be in a better position
today if it hadn't joined the Alliance and TPLF (the engine of disintegration)
in March 1999? Could the “opposition” be in a better standing today if ELF-RC
hadn’t blindly joined the Alliance in March 1999? And where is ELF-RC (the
chairman side) heading out now? Is it committed to peaceful and inclusive
opposition? Is it changing and correcting its past mistakes that plunged it into
the present crisis? Is it disassociating itself, notably from Woyane’s political
maneuverings? I believe one of the main keys for ELF-RC’s (the chairman side)
political breakthrough is to unequivocally distance itself from Woyane regime
once for all. Without that, nobody will take it seriously no matter what it does
and says. In this, it must be noted that Eritrean people change perspectives
constantly, but when the issue becomes defending the nation, they rally behind
their government. This is one among many key-distinguishing characters of
Eritrean people that the ELF-RC (the chairman side) should begin to absorb and
recognize for the opposition’s benefit. The ELF-RC (chairman side) can only
redeem itself if it seizes the present opportunity to correct its past mistakes
and failures.
Overall,
the ELF-RC didn't make a compelling case when it pulled out its membership from
the Alliance in Oct. 2002. For example, in the beginning the pull out seemed
collective, but after nine months of political furor, things faltered and marked
the biggest crisis ever to happen in ELF-RC history. Now, ELF-RC is engulfed
with the flame of schism and political vengeance at every level of its
organizational and operational structure. Look at the tit or tat destructive
politics between the senior cadres of ELF-RC on both sides. How much polarizing
and impulsive could you be? For example, read the exchange of words and punching
on the face between Ammar and Ismael Ali, or between Dr, Habte and Ammar (very
likely all good old friends). The crisis is breaking every bone of ELF-RC at all
levels. One side (Nassirites) defends the ENA, while the second (Suimites)
opposes the ENA. On a positive note, this time the fundamental disagreement
doesn’t seem to be focused only on whether ELF-RC should rejoin the ENA.
According to the evidences presented by both sides and particularly by the
chairman side, the major political fall out and contention lie at the heart
of the ENA's vision and conviction (declared principles and programs) as opposed
to simply calling to rejoin the ENA camp.
The
chairman side is raising fundamental issues, which primarily questions the
democratic commitment, faith, and objective of the Alliance. This is
encouraging. In addition, the chairman side believes the current squabble is not
limited to articles 3 and 4. Rather it is about policy fine-tuning,
shifting direction, and bringing factions that sympathize with them. For
example, on to the point, the Nharnet Team, the right arm of the chairman,
identified the Alliance members as follows:
As
with any global politics, the Eritrean politics has left and right extremism as
well a centrist ideologies and views. That is the corner stone of the current
campaign against ELF-RC and its leadership. The organizational platform is based
on purely secular democratic national principles that don’t serve the groups
that advocate the right religious extremists with a strategy of establishing
purely religious sharia government. This centrist principle equally challenges
the left extremists that advocate the split of our nation under their advocacy
of right of nations including secession, an outdated communistic ideology that
has been abandoned by almost all its previous sponsors. ELF-RC’s policy against
foreign interference in our internal national matters is in direct collision
with those who advocate to get rid of Isayas even at the expense of intrusion
into a national sovereignty
(http://www.nharnet.com/factsandfiction0819.htm).
If this is the stand of the chairman side, then it clearly marks a departure
from the Alliance camp for good. But how does this all fit together. Where does
the ELF-RC (chairman side) go from here? We will wait and
see.
On
the contrary, less is known about the Nassir side. They haven’t revealed their
plans to the public. We know the much lamented “Where to Now” article, declared
the formation of their own splinter group, called on the grassroots to rejoin
the ENA, and elected an interim leadership at the Kassel festival. Further, the
Nassir side doesn’t claim ideological differences to be the cause of the split
or the Oct. 2002 pull out from the ENA; the Nassir group attributes the crisis
to a number of undemocratic methods and approaches ELF-RC leadership employed
during the pull out in October 2002. Also, the Nassir side claims the walk out
was undemocratic and unprincipled in nature; and isolationist, divisive, and
disruptive by design. Finally, the Nassir group sees the ENA as the only viable
instrument to the quest of democracy in Eritrea. We will see if they are able to
do miracle in salvaging the badly damaged and Woyane funded
union.