Past and Present,
Eritrea's Leadership is to blame. Does Eritrea really
learn? Negaritt-Gazette 89E (NG89E)
, December 28 2002
"Eritrea needs us and we need Eritrea" (NG89E).
Introduction:
NG89E was founded on February 15 2001. Its first
version appeared on the internet on April 6 2002. This is now its second
version to publicise. Its motto is: 'free information to a free
generation in a freed mind'.
NG89E represents the voice of the 8 states and 9 ethnic
communities in Eritrea. One of its focuses is to expose Eritrea's
current or past history of any kind of political, social, cultural and
so on, activities that had or have been performed but manipulated by an
individual, an organisation, a government or a community. It functions
as a 'watch dog' with a philosophical theory as its background
principle. Its philosophical theory is that 'learning is building up and
moving forward to make a difference'. It recognises the concept of
living in difference. It rejects suffering in silence for good reason -
give and take information. To share its information with the people of
Eritrea, for Eritrea is its ethical and moral obligation. NG89E declares
to have no political affiliation to EPLF / PFDJ or ELF Parties. NG89E
draws the line not to take sides but it firmly believes in unity of all
Eritreans for peace and justice under the practice of the right
democracy.
Leadership
What is leadership? Leadership is a complex subject
that cannot be explained in a single statement. But for the purpose of
this article, NG89E, attempts to make an explanation of leadership and
its importance briefly by making it referable, visible and connectable
to the message of its writing by presenting two versions as follows:
1. "Leadership can be understood as a pattern of
behaviour, as a personal quality and as a political value. As a pattern
of behaviour, leadership is the influence exerted by an individual or
group over a larger body to organise or direct its efforts towards the
achievement of desired goals. As a personal attribute, leadership refers
to the character traits which enable the leader to exert influence over
others. Leadership in this sense is effectively equated with charisma,
charm or personal power. As a political value, leadership refers to
guidance and inspiration, the capacity to mobilise others through moral
authority or ideological insight" (R1, 2000).
2. "Leadership is
not only about character, skills and situations, but also about
relationships and the use of power. Here, there is an emphasis on the
categories of power when we look at an effective leadership on the
account of the power of the person, the power of knowledge and the power
of personality" (R2, 1988).
Position Power: Position power, as its name
implies, stems from one's place, or rank, in the hierarchy and sometimes
from the job title. It also includes access to resources. Resources are
people, equipment and money. This is the power of the boss who can hire
or fire someone with a good or bad reference and structure the
hierarchy. Hierarchy has, also a negative journey. Because hierarchial
position always confers a certain degree of power, and the steeper the
hierarchy, the more powerful each layer is perceived to be, until one
gets to the top. For example, someone with a position of power in the
lower or upper layer could say: I could do so much more if I were the
manager, director, minister, prime-minister, president etc. The trouble
is that the hierarchial positions entail just as many frustrations and
barriers in the layers of the hierarchy system. If progress is to be
made one needs more than 'position power' to become an effective leader.
On the contrary, a reliance on 'position power' makes it difficult to be
accepted as an effective leader. Because people do things out of fear
rather than they are inspired by a vision, principle and ideology.
Therefore, 'position power' can help a leader, but it needs to be
matched with other power resources.
Knowledge Power: If someone knows what they are
talking about, generally speaking, people will listen. 'Knowledge power'
is the stuff of credibility. Credibility will earn respect, respect can
give authority, and authority helps by enhancing one's chances of
leadership effectiveness. As you progress in your career, you will come
across quite a few people who are in so-called leadership positions who,
sadly, have no credibility. They have no insight into the issues and
concerns of the people they are supposed to be leading, and they have no
real knowledge of their activities: they have no knowledge of power.
They can only make things happen through their position power, and this
is negative and ultimately weak. This is not what effective leadership
needs to be about. Knowing the business is one of the most important
sources of power. Influencing through knowledge is a strong type of
power.
Personality Power and Charisma:
'Charisma' is referred to as 'born leaders'. This is
because the politicians are motivational speakers, who are out in front
telling you what they believe in and what you should believe in. They
touch you because they share your experiences and seem to know just how
you are feeling. They inspire you to greater determination and
self-help. Individuals with 'personality power' can be a long way ahead
in the leadership stakes. But 'personality power' is easy to abuse. It
is easy to become fond of the sound of one's own voice and forget to
keep knowledge up to date. It is easy to be seduced by professional
media attention and become all personality with no position and precious
little knowledge of the real world as do today the newspaper Haddas
Eritrea and Radio - Dimtzi Hafash (Radio Voice of the Masses) in the
case of President of Issaias Afeworki. This shows personality power can
be abused if it is used only to serve the interests of the powerful
rather than to meet the needs of the followers. In this case,
credibility will disappear eventually. That is to say that 'charisma and
personality power' are not always effective indicators for leadership.
But a charismatic personality can be turned into powerful leadership
when there is evidence of the following characteristics:
- "being able to communicate positive
self-esteem
- focusing on people
- having a clear vision
- promoting the vision to others
- implementing the vision" (R3, 1993).
Possessing the above skills is a sign of good
leadership. In other words, leaders who use charisma feel good about
themselves and about other people. They are interested in people and
encourage the group, organisation, party and so on to accomplish the
task, rather than focusing on the task itself. They know where they are
going and where they want to take others. They are able to articulate
the future, in a way that motivates and encourages others, and they are
able to get the job done together. This is workable and useful for
leaders who want to motivate through positive relationships rather than
by utilising controlling or authoritarian-type approaches as we see it
obviously to day in Eritrea.
In conclusion of this introductory part, questions
arise in regard with Eritrea's leadership in the past and present. Does
Eritrea really learn from its past? Does Eritrea learn from its present?
Does Eritrea have leaders who can demonstrate the above leadership
qualities? Why does Eritrea fail to put the lessons learned into
practice?
Now put these questions at the centre of discussion and
the following report may help to make the questions assertive in
comprehending Eritrea's past and contemporary history. It starts with
the development of the Eritrean National Alliance and goes to the
Eritrean Government during Federation between Eritrea and
Ethiopia.
On the 21st of October 2002 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
the new Eritrean National Alliance (ENA) of the ELF (Eritrea's Mother
Organisation, i.e. The Grand Jebha [Front] ) was
celebrating while its split sister, the ELF-RC walked out without
'splitting the difference'. This celebration of the majority was marked
as the end of their split of what was, by common agreement, their most
successful Political Party Conference for years. As it is known, the ELF
lost its armed struggle in the 1980s under the attack of EPLF and TPLF.
Its destruction was a plan of conspiracy coalition of the EPLF and TPLF.
Both EPLF and TPLF underwent an illogic periodical relationship,
ill-planned political game and gain, ill-defined profit and loss, and an
ill-defined strategy end. Most notably, the relationship was based on a
false personal friendship rather than the nations' interest. The outcome
of that masked, shelved, illogic and unscientific strategy of political,
economical, social and cultural agreements between EPLF and TPLF, came
to an end with the outbreak of war between the two, under the cover of
boundary conflict in May 1998. For Eritrea, the result was
multi-facetted negative. To mention a few:
- a bitter loss of our 19 thousands martyrs, i.e. a
loss of valuable manpower. But why?
- the scale of physical and mental disability of our
fighters in thousands. Why?
- a financial loss of millions of dollars to run war.
Why? That money could have saved lives of our people dying of poverty
and AIDS.
- a bitter loss of territory with the consequence of
disintegration and confusion of our people especially those living on
the boundaries between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Why?
- the plight of many thousands of Eritreans those
displaced and repatriated from inside Ethiopia to an unknown fate in
Eritrea, leaving their properties behind them. Why?
- and generally, a bitter disappointment,
torment, grievance of all our people that the Government of Eritrea
(GoE) has caused. These include the ban of private presses; the
jailing of ministers, journalists and uncountable and unknown others;
the captivity of our youth in the military trenches in the name of the
Sawa Project and the National Service; the endless service of
our 'Tegadelti' (fighters)
in the name of the national Defence Force etc. All these have led our
people to be in the state of redundancy. Our country is politically
isolated, economically paralysed and educationally back-driven to its
lowest stage even below the standard of the Dergue
period. As a result, our people are politically divided in their
views, opinion expression, assessment and make up of judgement of all
the consequences caused by the present Government. This unnecessary
division is creating a wall of 'pro' and 'contra'
Government. It is taking shape, particularly, on the issue of
government change if Eritrea is to survive. This unnecessary division
is contributing to lengthen the period of PIA for a while
although the GoE is practically already at its dead end. The
emphasis on the need to change a government is at the heart of the
masses whereas the few blind followers of PIA behave against the
masses, but tomorrow they will regret their behaviour.
For all these tragic avoidable mistakes in the past and
present, in the first place, it is President Issaias Afeworki (PIA)
to blame. PIA has been fooling every one for years. Violation
was the whole mark of his life. His irresponsibility in the political,
economical and social management, with all that power invested into him,
has brought chaos throughout Eritrean - people, land, sea and sky.
Behind him comes the whole leadership of the EPLF, today PFDJ from the
lowest rank to the highest cabinet as irresponsible. An irresponsible
person does things without considering the consequences. The irreparable
damage of PIA, the PFDJ and the voiceless Eritrean Parliament is so bad
that it cannot be put right again, despite the fact that only political
correctness of the GoE can save the unknown fate of Eritrea and
of the GoE itself. But this is unlikely to happen. On the
contrary, it is preparing its grave.
However, that is not all the history in Eritrea. The
Eritrean leadership during the Federation was also blundering. The
blunder, first, came from the first Chief Executive of Eritrea, Dej.
Tedla Bairu himself. Dej. Tedla Bairu came to power of the
Eritrean Presidency, even though elected by the newly elected Eritrean
Assembly in a secret ballot by the overwhelming majority vote of 49 to
11 on September 15, 1952, supported by Ethiopia. He clung to the rope of
power making Ethiopia as a backbone of his politics in the interest of
Ethiopia. But, finally, that power bestowed to Dej. Tedla Bairu was
again dismantled by Ethiopia. The question that needs to be asked is:
how did Dej. Tedla Bairu come to power? There are a range of facts that
speak for themselves. In order to answer and elaborate this question,
therefore, it is first advisable to follow and examine the facts of what
are narrated and written in the national and international literature of
Eritrea's events.
Fact One
Ethiopia managed to establish an instrumental political
party in Eritrea by exploiting our people's differences and lack of a
functional leadership. This is attestable from two different sources.
One is the Ethiopian literature itself in which some
Ethiopian scholars raise the issue in their attempt to describe how
'Federation' was constructed and dealt. Their admittance is that:
"The Unionists constituted the single largest political group
in Eritrea. … The Unionists were understandably supported by the
Ethiopian Government" (R4, 1991).
Second, Europeans like Lloyd Ellingson made an account
of this history in their writing.
"In 1946, it became the Unionist Party which stood
for the unconditional union of Eritrea and Ethiopia; its most active
member was Secretary General Tedla Bairu. Most Eritreans, however, were
against unconditional union with Ethiopia" (R5, 1977).
Dej. Tedla Bairu lived in a double standard character
and played a political game. His two games in one coin are explainable.
One side of his political coin was that initially, he was pro-Ethiopian
and proved his service to Ethiopia by taking the leadership as the
President of the Unionist Party (). His
direct and indirect involvement in and advocacy for Ethiopia's interest
was remarkable in many ways. He was recruiting and organising Eritreans
for Ethiopia's political mission against the will of the Eritrean
masses. In reality, the Eritrean people (especially the Lowlanders) were
against Ethiopia, but for Eritrea's separation and total independence.
Our people opposed any kind of Ethiopia's involvement in Eritrea. The
second side of his one coin was that his sticks were beating the empty
drum of the politics of the 'Federation Act' with Ethiopia
preaching 'Autonomy' his people as a political cover. But that
political cover was in truth without the consideration of any kind of
concrete content and vision of Eritrea's future. The point was that Dej.
Tedla Bairu lacked farsightedness and boldness in his leadership. His
Government was presenting wrong statistics of the Eritrean people to the
UN as evidence to support his political aim, to assemble Eritrea with
Ethiopia. For this tragedy, the witness is not only a written literature
but also a widespread belief of many Eritreans in their narration. One
example of similar behaviour, is the given Table of Statistics of
Opinion Expression of Representatives on page 25, that the numbers do
not match between the Membership Claims of one Party and its
Representatives Claim at the UN Hearings with the population's totality.
The Four Power Investigating Body made notes in its record that there
were disputes regarding the numbers of people claimed by Representatives
and that some minority views were not represented. Such a mistake is
acknowledged by Dej. Tedla Bairu himself but highlighted by the United
Nations in its own phrase as follows:
"The Secretary-General
of the Unionist Party, Mr. Tedla Bairu, admitted that the figures which
he had supplied relating to the supporters of his party were inaccurate
and that the Muslim population of the Western Lowlands had ceased to
support Union with Ethiopia. With regard to the Eastern Lowlands, he
preferred not to give a categorical reply until the question had been
studied by his Party."
(Untied Nations General Assembly,
Official Records Supplement 8, 1950, p. 31)
In spite of the unworthy intention of the Chief
Executive, Dej.Tedla Bairu tried to accommodate himself and his Party.
This was by gaining support of those Eritreans who were voting for
federation whom they trusted and thought the agreement under the
'Federation Act' would be honoured and implemented in practice.
But the supporters' dream for and realisation of the Federal Act,
faded and buried with time. Here the crucial point starts with the
question: what went wrong during his Presidency in Eritrea? The
literature research comes to the point that Dej. Tedla Bairu was more
interested in holding of his personal power rather than the realisation
and implementation of the interest and power of his Eritrean people. It
came to be clearer for his supporters and many other Eritreans as
Federation diminished. This was a result of Dej. Tedla Bairu's drawbacks
of personal qualities: in his leadership, political attitude and
intellectuality. It is these setbacks of Dej. Tedla Bairu that the
Eritrean literature again brings the next contexts (Facts Two - Twelve)
to light as follows. Undoubtedly, history is made for man to learn and
that man makes history. The core question is, do we Eritreans learn?
Fact Two
The 'pseudo-politic of federation' was part of Dej.
Tedla Bairu's activities, exercised in a two-faced card. Of course, Dej.
Tedla Bairu's election was legal and democratic. With the election of
the first Chief Executive of Eritrea in 1952, the majority of the
Eritrean Parliament Members were Unionists. This created a condition for
strong Unionists' political influence and decision-making on government
matters. The main opposition party, the Moslem League and others, each
representing its own Assembly members, were dominated by the Unionists.
The Unionists targeted the Moslem League Assembly members to persuade
them to be on their (Unionists) side. The main content of their
convincing message to win the Moslem League is displayed as following:
'that the Unionists were determined that Eritrea's interests
in the Federation would not be subordinated to Ethiopia's' (R6, 1960).
At this point, it is important to note that the Moslem
League was a strong opponent of the Unionist Party's politic in Eritrea
and in the Eritrean Parliament as highlighted earlier. Based on the
above drive but an erroneous belief, the Moslem League put its trust on
the shoulder of the Chief Executive, Dej. Tedla Bairu. Both their belief
and trust were the maintenance of 'Federation' in tact. What
happened was that in return, as part of political bargain, the Moslem
League was rewarded by the Unionists with the post of Parliament
Presidency. To make the point clear, the reward was that the Leader of
the Moslem League, Sheik Ali Mohammad Mussa Radai was declared as the
first Eritrean Parliament President, endorsed by the Unionists on the
15th of September 1952, the same day where the Chief Executive was
elected. But it must be stated that the Assembly President's election
was also formal in a secret ballot by which an overwhelming vote 48 to
17, with one abstention, was documented. Dej. Tedla Bairu's Unionist
Party political which promised to maintain Eritrea's Federal Act that
was embedded on a legal Constitution and Autonomy remained hollow and
failed to materialise. Analytically, by then is to understand that the
'Federation Act' was already flat.
Anyway, by contrast, the hollow promise was only to win
the Moslem League so that to obtain a co-player to achieve the goal of
the Unionist Party. That goal was to scratch off the 'Concept of
Federal Act' and the 'Concept of Autonomy' completely from
their existence as political contexts in the history of Eritrea, as
President Issaias Afework did the same by putting the new -1997 ratified
Eritrean Constitution in his drawer. History is simply repeating
itself.
(R29A, 1953, XXXVII)
Similarly, if not exactly, this historical Eritrea's
political scenario is again currently reflecting in the words of the new
Secretary-General of the Alliance of Eritrean National Forces (AENF),
Herui Tedla Bairu (delivered in an interview with Saleh AA Younis).
Herui said:
"Strategy and tactic are like Chinese chopsticks,
one stays in place while the other moves constantly" (Herui T. Bairu,
October 28 2002).
NG89E reads between the lines and this was
what happened in the past. If we are determined to learn, let us ask
ourselves whether the above Herui's statement contains a positive lesson
in our time. For NG89E, the interpretation is as simple as that Dej.
Tedla Bairu, was always dreaming to get a pass and promotion on the cost
of the others and the others not. This political proposition of Herui
exposes Herui himself to be in a more dangerous political dilemma and
more than the double standard of his father's behaviour. The reaction
and objection against the above view is again both simple and multiple.
Someone can use a tactic to win an enemy, but one cannot and must not
use a tactic to win his/her own people for the sake of personal
convenience and objectives of achievement. Herui's proposition can be
interpreted a lot both negatively and positively, but the negativity is
stronger than its positive sense. His statement is not applicable,
because our purpose is not to fight Sudan, Yemen, Djibouti, or Ethiopia
but our own Government. In Tigrigna's traditional expression, it
could be understood as
With this concept in mind, it is not the right
direction and proper thinking to apply such a strategy amid the current
Eritrea's problem. At present, Eritrea needs another political view,
solution and ideology. At the heart of the matter, there must be a
consideration of certain fundamental characteristics like believing in
'inclusion instead of exclusion', 'openness instead of secrecy',
'accountability and transparency instead of negligence and
irresponsibility', 'ruling with unity in diversity instead of divide and
rule system' and so on.
Furthermore, a word is enough for a wise man to
understand that the above Herui's statement describes his personality.
Politics can be a scholarship field to learn but not a travelling
journey to serve opportunists as in the case of Herui moving,
originally, from the ELF to EPLF and then from the EPLF to ELF. The
questions are: Where and what is the guiding principle? What is the
belief? What is the philosophy? What is the final standpoint? When is
the move to end?
Fact Three
Going back to the root of the story of his father's and
putting Herui's thinking aside for a while, there is a revealation to
make of the Eritrean federal history in context with Dej. Tedla Bairu.
This was that, the then members of the Eritrean Parliament were openly
opposing and criticising the administration of Dej. Tedla Bairu. They
had many reasons to do so. They were not like the so-called Parliament
members of today's Eritrea those who have proved themselves not to know
and understand their own rights. Then it is not an issue for these
present so-called 'Parliamentarians' to talk about the rights of their
people. But why are they called 'Parliament members'? This is again
another story. Therefore, it is better to stick to the continuity of the
writing in regard with old Eritrea's Parliament and its members with
their right to criticise each other. One example of their critics
against the Chief Executive was that the issue of handling of the
registration of foreigners in Eritrea. This was made public by the
anti-Unionist Parliament Members. They demanded Dej. Tedla Bairu the
regulation of the Government Administrative System by the avoidance of
corruption. As a response to the Eritrean Parliament, he prepared a
message of negativity. His comments are recorded in the protocol as:
the Chief Executive, Tedla Bairu "rejected the
appeal on the remarkable ground that, in invoking the name of the
Emperor's Representative, the Assembly was guilty of irreverence"
(R7-FO, 03.01.53).
For the Chief Executive, 'irreverence' is
considered as disobedience for the Ethiopian Emperor, because by
definition it means 'not showing any respect'. With such clear
response, it is not hard to say that the Eritrean Chief Executive, Dej.
Tedla Bairu, laid down a demonstration of self-evidence that he was not
a man of politics and leadership neither for himself nor for Eritrea. On
the contrary, his response (proposition) remarked Dej. Tedla Bairu's
credibility as an Ethiopian agent, and proved his obedience to the
Ethiopian political will and drive, in theory and practice. He was
neither willing to listen to his people nor his parliamentary opponents,
in order to make changes by correcting the wrongs using the rights given
to him, as a Chief Executive. Instead, he preferred to respect the
Emperor of Ethiopia. This is what is to understand and conclude the
above given revealing example.
Fact Four
The revealing evidence of the Eritrean literature goes
further. This was about the then President of the Eritrian Parliament,
Sheik Ali Mohammad Mussa Redai. President Sheik Ali Mohammad Mussa Radai
presented his alarming concerns about Ethiopia to Dej. Tedla Bairu. The
President, Sheik Ali Mohammad Mussa Radai observed and weighed the
Ethiopian political attitude and Dej. Tedla Bairu's weakness of
leadership. But the Chief Executive Dej. Tedla Bairu failed him to
understand and recognise the concerns of Sheik Ali Redai, the President
of the Eritrean Parliament. By all means and comparatively speaking, Ali
Redai, even though he also, as the leader of the Moslem League Political
Party, was not free from making a mistake in disintegrating Eritrean
provinces, proved his intellectuality and vision by his unmistakable
comment saying
"that a hyena had been put with a goat and the
result was obvious".
Well, this comment was not hard to understand to
someone who is a real politician and to someone who understands politics
with a commonsense. The concept of 'hyena' represented the
behaviour of Ethiopia or the then Emperor Haile Sellasie, and the
concept of 'a goat' represented the behaviour of Eritrea or the
then Dej. Tedla Bairu. That is to say that the hyena (Ethiopia)
will swallow the goat (Eritrea) by any means. Exactly, this point
was realised in practice and theory as Ethiopia put the Federal Act and
the Eritrean Constitution in a drawer and illegally declared Eritrea as
part of the Mother Land - Ethiopia already in 1958 and the Eritrean flag
stepped down from its same mast position of an Ethiopian flag. The
outcome is to argue that the leadership deceived the Eritrean people.
Fact Five
Concern had focused on the roles of the Eritrean
Government when looking at the shortcoming of the political and
managerial administration of Dej. Tedla Bairu. It is essential to notice
what Mr. E.J. Howes, the then British Consulate-General evidently
revealed and identified with regard to the Chief Executive. The British
Consulate-General raised his concerns about Eritrea's facing problems
and highlighted in his report to his Government of Great Britain. The
following is the extract of Mr. Howes report (R8, 1953):
"As
far as the Government's relation with the Federal Authorities were
concerned, the opinion of the British Consulate-General was that the
Eritrean Government led by Tedla Bairu did not stand firm and demand the
strict application of the Federal Act as embodied in the Constitution.
Tedla Bairu preferred to function as the errand boy of the Emperor's
Representative rather than as an Executive of the Eritrean Cabinet and
of the Assembly that elected him. The judgement of the British
Consulate-General strongly emphasised that "Tedla Bairu was not up to
the heavy responsibilities placed on him".
What is an errand boy? An errand is a short trip
that someone makes to do a job for someone. What is to be drawn from
this British report extract? Obviously, the answer is that Dej. Tedla
Bairu was not in the position to follow the formal rule, law and power
given to him from the Head (Central) Office of the Government of Eritrea
including Parliament. Dej. Tedla Bairu misused and misplaced the
Eritrean power and laid down a stone of a beginning end of the
Federation Act. He contributed and prepared a solid-rock
political atmosphere in favour of Ethiopia against his own nation and
people's desire. Narrative reports and literature reveal that Dej. Tedla
Bairu was counter-productive in many ways as indicated earlier. Many
Eritrean civilians and members of Eritrean Parliament from the Moslem
Communities, especially the Moslem League, were strongly campaigning to
keep, at least, the Eritrean autonomy intact to be able to ensure the
practice of their rights given to them by the resolution of the UN. Dej.
Tedla Bairu created anger and disappointment in the Eritrean Parliament
and the Eritrean society as a whole instead. As noted earlier, it is a
considerable argument that he was more concerned with his personal power
and the privileges that emanated from it opposing his accountability and
responsibility.
Fact Six
Not only was that, the accusations against the Chief
Executive's political career, but his lack of seriousness in seeking
consultation and involvement in the matters of his Cabinet and Assembly
advice, argument and debate with his Eritreans. As a country leader, he
did not show an interest in resolving Eritrea's internal issues of
conflict or discontent, instead, he made the way free for Ethiopia's
involvement in the Eritrean internal affairs. For this episode, more
vividly, British documents give evidence of their observation that the
Chief Executive, Dej. Tedla Bairu lost popularity of his people and the
support of the Eritrean police, whose great majority favoured the
'federalist position' through their membership. Because Dej.
Tedla Bairu as Chief Executive did fail to demonstrate a clear policy
vis a vis the Federal Authorities (R9, British Head of the Police,
1954).
Fact Seven
Stung by condemnation, the Government of Deg. Tedla
Bairu abused the Eritrean workforces and lost its sense of ethical
auditing for its own benefits in its strategy of strengthening a
sectarian power. This was a political and administrative corruption that
was engulfed to its highest peak in the reign of Dej. Tedla Bairu. This
corruption was highlighted by the British documentary protocol made by
Cracknell (1954) in his interview with the Chief Executive, Dej. Tedla
Bairu and emphasised that
"the Chief Executive, Dej. Tedla
Bairu, was reminded that his extensive private transactions, and the
appointment of old political associates and people from his district to
senior posts in the civil service had made the people lose so much
confidence that if he (Dej. Tedla Bairu) so desired he would have to
reassure people by deeds" (A Report written by R10 - to Wardle-Smith,
the then British Consul).
At this stage, it is no more argumentative but seems
more obvious that such a political or administrative corruption was
serious. This renders a further evidence of failing to reason and/or
failing to understand the leadership by putting the Chief Executive in a
question in his time.
Fact Eight
The literature makes it evidently to explain a ploy of
political relationship between Eritrea's Dej. Tedla Bairu and Ethiopia.
The ploy was that his determination to abolish the Federation
much sooner than the Ehiopian Authorities thought. With that design,
Dej. Tedla Bairu made a breach to the Eritrean Federal Contract.
The British Government asserted in its follow-up reports, that the most
threat to the Federation was the Chief Executive's desire for
more power to be granted from Ethiopia. Not only was that the case of
Dej. Tedla Bairu. The British Consul produced the following
report:
"It would be disastrous to allow the Chief Executive
to get his way. With a controlled judiciary in the hands of the Chief
Executive, who is giving every indication of being a megalomaniac, there
is no knowing what may happen here. Certainly foreigners and foreign
interests would receive rough treatment and political opponents would be
annihilated. Surely we should make every effort to prevent such a state
of affairs coming about. The United Nations representative tells me he
has reported to the Secretary General in much the same terms
(03.04.1954)".
The British Consul witnessed that Tedla Bairu made
it clear that, if everything depended on him, he would favour complete
union with Ethiopia (17.09.54).
This shows that Eritrea's Federation right formed by
Constitution accomplished by the United Nations and given to our people
was stamped out, for Ethiopia's good by Dej. Tedla Bairu and his
Unionist Party: the main body of the Government.
Fact Nine
A literature search makes explicit that the Unionist
Party in Eritrea contributed to the plight of the Eritreans by taking
advantage of the money flowing from Ethiopia. Historians and British
Officials give the following report as evidence (R11, 1983 and R12,
1977).
"In Eritrea, much the same position was taken by the
'Patriotic Association for the Union of Eritrea and Ethiopia' led by
Dej. Beyene Beraki and Ato (later Dej.) Tedla Bairu. Its members called
for the unconditional integration of the colony into the 'motherland',
totally opposing partition or trusteeship. The party was headquartered
in Asmara, where Col. Nega Haile Sellasie, Ethiopia's liaison officer to
the British Military Administration, also advised and subsidized the
Unionists out of monies collected in Addis Ababa by the "Society for the
Unification of Ethiopia and Eritrea".
Since the above extract provides a clear message, it
seems reasonable at this moment to discuss the terms 'partition'
and 'trusteeship'. What is partition? Partition is
the division of a country into independent areas. This option was
rejected by the great majority of Eritreans and was politically unwise.
What is trusteeship? By definition, a
trustee is someone who is allowed by law to control money or
property they are keeping or investing for another person. But the
context of 'trustee' was more than its definition in the case of
Eritrea. The concept of 'trusteeship' was one of Eritrea's
options for political solution expressed by some Representatives of the
main Eritrean Political and Social Parties. Such views and other options
were heard by the United Nations of the Four Powers (France, Great
Britain, Soviet Union, United States) through their Investigating
Commission Body of 5-member nations (Burma, Guatemala, Norway,
Pakistan, South Africa) in the 1940s and 1950s during their
investigation in Eritrea. The Trustee Powers for Eritrea were the
United Kingdom (UK), Italy and the United Nations. In general,
the main expressed options of preferences of our people (the Eritrean
Representatives) were:
- Independence for Eritrea
- Union with Ethiopia
- Trusteeship under the UK, or Italy, Four Powers,
or the UN
- Partition of the territory and annexation of the
Eastern part to Ethiopia and the Western Province to the Sudan.
The Commission held hearings at different times and
various areas in Eritrea to gather information and to ensure the desires
and wishes of our people and country's future. However, our people
failed on leadership disunity directed and influenced by political and
religious divisions in Eritrea. As a result, they could not reach an
agreement on a common ground. The Coptic Church and the Islamic Religion
heavily steered and influenced the political field of Eritrea. Further,
organisations held for hearings were also strongly influenced by members
and Representatives of the Unionist Party, as the single largest party
compared to the other available parties, reported the Four Power
Commission. But, the Four Power Commission got an insight of the
internal and external problems and allegations for its own
consideration.
Out of the different hearings, a conclusion was drawn
to keep the integrity of the whole Eritrea as its national entity and
identity. Because two different positions were crystallised that emerged
out of the different views in solving the Eritrean colonial question.
The one side was that the disagreement among the Eritreans themselves as
noted above. The second side of the crystal was that the Four Commission
Investigating Body came out also with different conclusive views and
suggestions about Eritrea that could neither satisfy our people. This
division and disagreement of the Eritrean people on the one hand and the
UN - Four Power Commission in their differing decision on the other
hand, came to be the main cause for creating the final verdict of the
United Nations Resolution to suggest that the only neutral notion of
solution of that time might be, was that the 'Federation' with
Ethiopia. This resolution took place in September 1952 under the Crown
of the Emperor. Of course, the decision of the UN was not to the fullest
satisfaction of either side: Eritrea or Ethiopia. To some extent
compared to the past, it was a kind of relief and rehabilitation of
Eritrea from the suffering of the long run of European colonial rule
including periodical invasions of the Turks and Egyptians in Eritrea.
That decision of the UN in today's eyes and generation could be
different. Nevertheless, it was a hard inheritance of pain that took us
again another 30 years to reverse the case until the re-birth of
Eritrea's colony-de-facto-state in May 1991. Its official and formal
recognition by the International Community (UN) was marked on May 24
1993 being a sovereign and an independent state: The State of Eritrea, a
new colony-born state. For this achievement, the EPLF gets credit
irrespective of the present state of misery and its internal history of
conflict. There is only one truth at a time to be told but with out
colouring and manipulating it. Whatever ending story as it may be, it is
still necessary to link the message of the writing by going back to the
root of the body.
Thus, thanks to the effort of an Eritrean scholar,
Professor Habtu Ghebre-ab (PhD), who gave an account of a documentary
study of the United Nations (Four Power Commission Investigation for
the Former Italian Colonies - Vol. I: Report on Eritrea 1948)
summarised as follows, and this will help to weigh and make up the mind
on who carried the torch for a nation's generation burden with a high
cost but valuable resources: materials, animals and human lives:
- "Hamasien Division: 95.8% of
its inhabitants expressed for unconditional union with
Ethiopia
- Akel-Guzai Division: 70% of its inhabitants
expressed their views for unconditional union with
Ethiopia
- Seraye Division: 77.6% of its inhabitants
expressed their views for unconditional union with
Ethiopia.
- Western Province (mainly Senhit, Barka including
Settit (Barentu): 74.9% of their inhabitants expressed their views for
the 'British Trusteeship' for a period of ten years to be followed by
'independence'.
- Massawa Division (Red Sea) including Dankalia:
86% of their inhabitants expressed their views in favour of an
'Italian Trusteeship' as first and a 'British Trusteeship' as second".
(Report on Eritrea 1948, cited in R13, 1993)
The Four Power Commission documented the above
result of view expressions heard from the Representatives of the main
five parties. These main parities were:
- The Patriotic Association for the Union of
Eritrea with Ethiopia known as Unionist Party:
Its political aims were: a) the unconditional
union of Eritrea with Ethiopia; b) opposing the return of Italian
domination; c) rejecting the institution of foreign
trusteeship.
Most of its members were partly Europeanised urban
Christians and a number of Moslem aristocrats from the Western Plains
of Eritrea expressing a special desire for them. This was expecting
Ethiopia to be in their favour in maintaining their feudal privileges.
Ethiopia provided the finance of this Party. The Orthodox Church of
Eritrea took an active role in becoming an instrument of this Party's
manoeuvring system in Eritrea.
- The Moslem League:
Its political aims
were: a) against union with Ethiopia or annexation to Ethiopia or any
other country; b) the independence of Eritrea, if this was not
immediately achievable, then 'internal independence' under the
'trusteeship' of the United Nations represented by Great Britain, or
directly by the United Nations; c) the reservation of territorial
unity of Eritrea in its boundaries known before 1935 including
Dankalia, and certain areas of the Sudan.
Other
Aims: a) conservation and defence of Moslem rights; b) strengthening
the relations among the Moslem communities; c) establishing an
organisation of communication in favour of the Moslems' economical,
political, social and educational developments. The Moslem League was
led mainly by religious leaders. It was co-operative with the Liberal
Progressive Party on common political issues concerning Eritrea's
future.
- The Liberal Progressive Party:
Its
political aims were: a) the independence of Eritrea as a separate
entity including Tigrai and certain areas of the Sudan;
b) rejecting the annexation of Eritrea to Ethiopia; c) advocating for
the progressive independence of Eritrea under the control of the
United Nations.
- The New Eritrean Pro-Italy Party termed Pro-Italy
Party for short:
Its political aim was: Italian
trusteeship to lead Eritrea for independence.
- The Moslem National Party of Massawa:
Its political aim: British administration for ten years under
the control of the United Nations followed by complete independence.
Fact Ten
It is worth discussing the evidence of political
trouble connected with an ethical, a legal and responsibility dilemma.
There is no better expression than to say it is the misconduct of Dej.
Tedla Bairu. This misconduct was noticed publicly when he forced in
vain, the then Chief Justice and President of the Eritrean Supreme Court
to resign on the decision of Dej. Tedla Bairu, as President Issaias
Afeworki did in 2001 with Mr. Teame Beyene, the Chief of the Supreme
Court. Dej. Tedla Bairu's attempt was beyond the legal power of the
Chief Executive. The literature further reveals that the Ethiopian
representative once conceded to the British Consul that Tedla Bairu
could be impeached for his unconstitutional action in regard with the
Supreme Judges' request for resignation. This was the failure of the
Chief Executive to respect the independence of the judiciary so as
PIA doing today in the 21st Century. This produced a political
foe that both the British Administration in Eritrea and Ethiopia took a
stance against him. It was at this stage that Dej. Tedla Bairu came to
realise that he was at the dead end of power given to him. This
discontent with Ethiopia and Great Britain was one of the reasons that
caused Dej. Tedla Bairu to resign.
Fact Eleven
The revealation of failing to reason and failing to
understand was the Chief Executive's breach with the Eritrean Assembly.
Some of the examples were: a) Dej. Tedla Bairu's frequent absence from
Asmara, b) less-bread-winning performance from Ethiopia, c) and
dissatisfaction from his own Unionist Party, were all factors that
contributed to his downfall further. One typical example of an
accusation was an embarrassing despatch that was hard for the Chief
Executive to see, read and to be told of it. This was quoted
as:
"Despatch No. 25. American Consulate, Asmara, to the
Department of State, Washington D.C. September 3, 1952. Tedla Bairu also
received an American car from the Emperor. See Despatch No. 57. To
ordinary citizens, grain bribes were being given. See Telegram No.
1011030Z, October 10, 1949. American Legation, Addis Ababa, to the
Secretary of State, Washington D.C. The Ethiopian Liaison Officer, Negga
Haile Selassie, was also successful in bribing some anti-Unionist
leaders such as Seyoum Me'asho. See Telegram from the American Legation,
Addis Ababa, to the Secretary, Washington D.C. No. 202. September 26,
1949".
Therefore, his administrative and political corruption,
his accommodation in making of suitable conditions for the divisions
among politicians, disappointments and resentments among Eritreans
initiated by the Chief Executive, came to hit back at himself by his own
people to close down his political era forever. It was a high price to
pay. That episode was easy to interpret and understand in Tigrigna's
saying in three examples:
Because that was not the case of positivity and comfort for the people
of Eritrea during Dej. Tedla Bairu, a new phase developed out of it, in
favour of Bet'Weded (shortened Bet.) Asfaha
Woldemichael, known as 'merah menghisti ',
literally means 'Government Leader'.
It was this
leadership situation that favoured the welcome greeting of Bet. Asfaha
Woldemichael. The welcome came from among many Eritrean lowlanders and
highlanders in protest against the rule of Dej. Tedla Bairu's in
Eritrea. Here, at the same time, it is extraordinarily important that
one must note that our people made political correctness' by changing
the Chief Executive for Eritrea as their choice, but done mistake by
mistake. In today's view, critics could say that decision was wrong, but
in their time it was another for many reasons. Educational level,
political awareness, infra-structure, poverty, culture, life experience
and so on, all these play a role in meeting a decision and making a
choice.
Fact Twelve
In general terms, the literature search has looked,
with interest, at the political vision and administration skills of Dej.
Tedla Bairu. The result is to confirm that these two were negative from
different aspects and evaluation sources. These two weak points of the
Chief Executive were reflective. These were also witnessed and portrayed
by the political opinion analysis of Dej. Haregot Abbay. Dej. Haregot
Abbay served in the Government of Dej. Tedla Bairu as a Director of the
Interior. Analysing and observing the political twist, Dej. Haregot
Abbay came to the conclusion that 'the Federal Act would only work on
the condition that the Eritreans themselves held together and did not
remain divided'. However, Dej. Tedla Bairu did not take the opinion
of Dej. Haregot Abbay to his heart seriously. By contrast, it seems
clear to argue that Dej. Tedla Bairu and his double standard in the
Eritrean politics failed his people and his country Eritrea.
Consequently, that caused his total resignation from power.
In addition, there was a significant contribution to
his resignation. That contribution came from Ethiopia's insisting force
to see Dej. Tedla Bairu resign his position of Chief Executive. Because
the Chief Executive had expressed his disquiet over Ethiopia's policy of
depriving Eritreans of the human rights promised them in the
Constitution. He should have done this a long time ago to show the legal
power of Eritrea in its own right, but late. He did neither try to keep
the balance of power between the two separate entities nor resist the
Ethiopian political developments in Eritrea while he was in power. His
resignation just happened on July 29 1955.
Dej. Tedla Bairu, one of the chief architects of union,
finally, lost all his dreams of power in the light of his background.
When resigned, he went to Ethiopia and resided there first. After nine
months of stay in Ethiopia, he was then appointed by the Emperor as an
Ethiopian Ambassador to Sweden on May 9 1956 (R14, 2000, p.459). For
Dej. Tedla Bairu, this post was not more than a moral support. When
returned from Sweden, his last post in the Ethiopian political and
administrative ruling hierarchy, was his appointment as a member of the
Ethiopian House of Senate. Dej. Tedla Bairu felt and understood that he
was not treated by Ethiopia with fairness, after his post of the Chief
Executive in Eritrea. All the appeasement did not satisfy Dej. Tedla
Bairu.
NG89E, in its attempt to present this analysis, has
collected some narrated valuable information from some close friends and
observers of the Chief Executive who still hold the view of his personal
dissatisfaction and frustration that resulted from his discharge from
all powers in Eritrea and Ethiopia. Dej. Tedla Bairu began to rethink
his past against Ethiopia when he was completely disappointed with
Ethiopia. Hence, he completed his political pilgrimage by defecting to
the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in 1967 (R15, 1990, p. 68). But,
first, Dej. Tedla Bairu left for Sweden, where he lived from Head of
State to a refugee status engineered by self-mistake, until the last
moment of his life. However, his re-think to criticise Ethiopia and his
final understanding and recognition of his people's suffering and his
determination to join the ELF, could now be credited, even though it was
too late to save Eritrea. He started to play a role in Europe with
regard to Eritrean politics, in particular, in the Middle East between
Cairo (Egypt) and Damascus (Syria) after his contact with his Eritrean
colleagues, like Sheik Idris Mohammad Adum (the then President of the
Eritrean Assembly) in Cairo.
But as indicated earlier, all these in turn, gave an
opportunity to Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael to replace Dej. Tedla Bairu. The
power replacement was done through the process of democratic election
mandated by the people and Parliament of Eritrea. Bet. Asfaha
Woldemichael's election as Chief Executive of Eritrea was on the 8th of
August 1955. A secret ballot took place and 48 Parliament Members
(Constituents) voted in his favour and 17 against his election. Bet.
Asfaha Woldemichael's political position as pro-Ethiopian, even though
he was not the right man for Eritrea, was clearly visible in all his
politics from the very beginning to his friends, relatives and his
counterpart Eritrean politicians. It was not a secret. His belief and
policy towards Ethiopia remained unchanged from its pregnancy to its
delivery and its life span. Before his election to Chief Executive of
Eritrea, Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael was serving in Eritrea as a
Vice-Representative of Ethiopia. This post in itself was a clear
evidence of who he was and for what he was.
Again, it is worth discussing the question: what made
Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael credible in entering a political arena as a
career? The answer is and was his clear policy line to Ethiopia
throughout his life with having no character, symptom or sign of double
standard compared to Dej. Tedla Bairu. Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael was an
Eritrean so as Dej. Tedla Bairu. Their main difference was that Bet.
Asfaha Woldemeichael devoted his life to Ethiopia governed by a straight
political principle and ideology more than the life of Dej. Tedla Bairu
did. Bet. Asfaha Woldemeichael worked wholeheartedly for Ethiopia and
his mission in Eritrea was Ethiopia, as said before. Initially, both had
the same view of Unionist Party in Eritrea towards Ethiopia, and each of
them was educated in different European Mission Schools in Eritrea as
well as abroad, having different religious beliefs within Christianity.
Dej. Tedla Bairu was an Evangelic, and Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael was a
Catholic. Then, what drove Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael to think for
Ethiopia rather than his homeland? There is a considerable explanation
for this political stand of Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael. The next is a
brief answer to the question.
(R16, 2000, p. 533)
Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael assessed and weighed Eritrea's
problems and consequences of the 1940s and 1950s of his time. In his
analysis, the problems were: a) the Eritrean internal political
disarray, b) the cultural differences, especially religion - Moslem and
Christian, as a main factor of discontent, c) economical concerns due to
the 'shifta (outlaw) crisis' in Eritrea that caused insecurity
and the demolishing of Eritrean resources and infrastructure installed
by the Italians under the British rule by the British themselves, that
caused unemployment and poverty, and d) the least but not the last, in
particular, the consideration of the influence of the Eritrean
surrounding on the Eritrean communal culture. For example, the interests
of Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia in Eritrea for three main reasons were not
exaggerated. This was firstly as a result of the influence of British
rule in Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt. Secondly, due to the religious
relation of the people in Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt based on Islam. This
point can be more highlighted on the account of Egypt's claim to
Eritrea. Egypt brought its case to the UN-Political and Territorial
Committee of the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, raising three main
perspectives. These are that: i) Eritrea's geographical importance for
its sea service as natural geographical extension to the Eastern Sudan,
ii) Eritrea is ethnologically an Arab community, and iii) economically,
Eritrea forms with the Eastern Sudan as out and inlet of trade and
commerce. Thirdly and similarly, the Ethiopian influence in Eritrea
based on the Christian culture in addition to Ethiopia's economy-based
interest to gain access to the Eritrean Red Sea mainly on the advice of
the United States of America and Great Britain for their own political
and economical advantages.
Having observed the above Eritrea's collective crisis,
Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael pointed out in his political argument and
analysis in Eritrean meetings in Asmara as following:
"A
workload that a camel carries out, cannot be carried out by a
donkey".
What does this expression mean? It can widely be
interpreted. But the main point of it, as seems to NG89E, lies within
the attribution of descriptive terms of someone's behaviour / character
when describing the functions seen in the long term like, skills /
ability, stability, durability, effectiveness, productivity, continuity,
ageing (long life and life span), peace, pleasure and so on. These
attributions can be effectively materialised and differentiated only on
the ground of its physiological and biological nature in its function.
It would be quite wrong to suppose that both the donkey and the camel do
their jobs according to their ability. This is clear. According to
ability, is a universal truth. But this is not the point of the above
message. The camel is efficient to accomplish the job of its owner even
at times of hardship more than the donkey can. This does not mean that
Eritrea was not sufficient to rule itself. But due to the fact, the
terrible conditions those days outweighed, Eritrea was not in the
position to take its life into its own hands. There was a chance for
Eritrea to stay under the 'trusteeship' of either the United Kingdom,
Italy, Four Powers, or the United Nations, but our people did not agree.
In the case of Ethiopia, our people were again divided. The option left
was 'federation' as explained earlier. Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael
was analytically the results of the crisis of that period of political,
economical, social and cultural environment in Eritrea that was almost
chronic for more than five decades. These results were again in summary:
firstly, the Eritrean internal political differences; secondly, culture
and value differences; thirdly, Eritrea's surrounding world political
views and influences on Eritrea. All these made up the judgement that
the Eritrean economy and politics could hardly be stable. Politics is a
means of stability. If politics is not stable, it influences and governs
the economy of one's nation and vice versa as we see it today in Eritrea
in reality without the need to refer to Somalia as an example.
Another significant factor that influenced many
Eritreans to intend to Ethiopia was their life experience during the
foreign rules in Eritrea. Throughout the history of Eritrea, it wasn't
entirely trouble free, but more troublesome. In particular the harsh
colonial rule of Italy and Great Britain such as, the white supremacy,
discrimination, slavery and so on, was the most unforgettable and
unforgivable part of the Eritrean memories. Based on their life
experiences, Eritreans did not want to see any Europeans anymore on
their soil, but wanted their liberation to see their 'black society' in
peace and freedom. To explain this, consider the following three
examples expressed by British reports and many Eritrean patriots that
have telling words.
Example 1
A British report stated:
They (Eritreans)
complain we (British) have maintained the prestige of the whites and
that things are no better than before. They (Eritreans) claim we have
cheated them with our promises and have apparently forgotten how
courageously they fought against the Italians at Keren and elsewhere
when we (British) came to liberate them" (R17, British Memorandum, June
28, 1941).
Example 2:
Eritreans' report ('a' and 'b') stated:
a)
"The Italians say that Ethiopia is a country without history, a country
of slaves, and that it is not known from whom they descend; yet they
went out of their way to destroy the convents and burn the Holy
books".
b) "Italy invaded Ethiopia not to bring civilisation, but
to make the people slaves and call their children heathens. Italy was
from the first the disorganiser of the Ethiopian people. It did not give
'peace, work, bread and justice,' it did not wish to see the tribes
unite. Italy sought decade by decade to destroy Ethiopia, to plunge her
in poverty without goods, without land to cultivate, without commerce,
without even sandals to walk with. How can we be mistaken, we Eritreans
who for 50 years have been deprived of everything?" (R18, a and b: A
Document addressed to the British Authorities, December 12,
1941).
Example 3
"This criminality in Eritrea is
of a political nature; the cause of these murders is most probably that
the Italians are helping the Blocco di Independenzia (translated into
English it means an 'Independence Bloc'). Why is Italy so much
interested in the fate of our country? We do not desire the return of
Italy, even the new masquerade of the 'Blocco'. We declare that we are
fed up with carrying the yoke of slavery; we have decided to unload the
yoke. It is our fervent desire to be incorporated within our Motherland,
Ethiopia" (Eritrean Patriots' Compliant presented to the British
Administration, cited in R19, 1953, p. 182).
The hatred was
at its peak. This was one of the reasons why Eritreans were not for
'trusteeship' of Great Britain or Italy with a majority voice.
Again, this was one reason, why many Eritreans were heading to Ethiopia
seeking safety and race equality opposing the colonial 'divide and
rule system' and 'white supremacy'. That movement partly
contributed a ground to flourish the establishment of an 'Association
for Love of a Country' in Ethiopia that had a root link to the Unionist
Party in Eritrea. Furthermore, the following Extracts 1-7 will
demonstrate the past life experience of our people under colonial yoke.
These were taken from the collection of Eritrean literature and from the
corresponding documents between London and Asmara under the British
Administration in Asmara. These situations and others led the Eritrean
heart to be hardened against the Europeans and soften their heart to the
Black world. On the latter account, Prof. B. Habte Sellasie (R20, 1980,
p. 45) agrees with the idea that our people needed the alliance of the
southern neighbours (Ethiopia) when analysing the history of Eritrea. In
his own words, he puts it (Extract 1) as following:
Extract 1
"Historically, the strategic
factor has impinged on Eritrean politics, imposing constraints on the
struggle to maintain or regain independence. In that long struggle some
form of inter-dependence has alternated with autonomy and isolation.
When Turko / Egyptian hegemony or European colonisation was the main
threat, Eritreans sought alliance (and in some cases refuge) with their
southern neighbours. When Ethiopian expansion was the threat, succour,
and/or alliance was sought elsewhere" (R20, 1980).
Extract 2
A pledge that none of the former Colonies of Italy
would be restored to her was specifically given to the British
Parliament by Mr. Eden, on October 4th, 1944, as follows:
Mr.
Barstow asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, in
view of the Ministry of Information pamphlet, "The First to be Freed,"
recording that slavery was practised by the Italian Government in their
Colony of Somaliland, and the neglect of sanitation, public health,
water supply and education in Eritrea and Somalia, the imprisonment for
years, without trial and under bad conditions, persons guilty of no
crime known to the laws of civilised countries, he will assure the House
that His Majesty's Government is opposed to the return of the Colonies
to Italy, and that their declaration that the Italian Empire in Africa
is irrevocably lost will be strictly adhered to?" (R21, British Foreign
Minister, 1944, quoted in R22, 1952, pp. 10-11)
Extract 3
"It is therefore evident
that the British Administration of Eritrea had the duty of acting purely
as a caretaker, and, as such, was responsible for the care and
maintenance of the territory and its installations, without any right to
undertake the vast dismantling and dispersal which in fact have been
effected, and are even now continuing" (R23, 1952, p. 11).
Extract 4
"….. The former Colonies
having been placed under the jurisdiction of the United Nations pending
a decision concerning their future, it is clear that neither Britain nor
the United States had any right to dismantle or remove any of the
installations found in these territories at the time of Italy's defeat.
Nevertheless, dismantling and destruction has been carried out on a vast
scale" (R24, 1952, p. 12).
Extract 5 - Eyewitness: First Hand
Report
During my (Sylvia Pankhurst) visit to Eritrea early
in 1952, I motored from Asmara, the capital of the territory, to the
port of Massawa. I was accompanied by an Ethiopian familiar with
Eritrea, and by Mr. Mohammad Omar Khadi, an Eritrean Moslem, a gentle
merchant, who surprised me by his familiarity with European political
literature, ranging from the works of John Locke and the Social Contract
of Jean Jacques Rousseau to Bernard Shaw's "Everybody's Political What's
What."
I (Sylvia Pankhurst in Massawa) was extremely distressed
by the sight of this callous and senseless vandalism. "It is a disgrace
to British civilisations," said Mohammad Omar Kadi; his words affected
me painfully, like blows, so just they were my opinion. I was grieved
and down hearted" (R25, 1952, p. 14).
Extract 6 - Attempts to Stop Demolitions; Fallacious
British Government Reply
"I had not been prepared for this
enormous destruction, though early 1951 I had been informed by an
Eritrean student in London that the British Administration was
demolishing and removing from Eritrea installations the loss of which
was considered harmful to the Eritrean people. I had mentioned the
matter at the time to Mr. Peter Freeman, M.P., the Chairman of the
International Council for Study and Report, who had written to the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on January 17th and on February
13th, 1951, to ascertain the facts, and in the hope of preventing
further demolitions" (Mr. Younger's Reply of behalf of the Foreign
Secretary, cited in R26, 1952, p. 17).
Extract 7
"….. when the initial
victory over Italy had been won the future of Eritrea was held in
suspense; the territory was governed by Italian fascist law and fascist
officials under a British Military Administration" (R27, 1953, P.
12).
All the above descriptive factors together as a bone of
political content drove Eritrea into the hands of Ethiopia from which
Eritrea must learn today to resolve its problems of culture and to start
to live together in unity as it is seen during the thirty years of war
for independence so that to be able to fight and win the external
factors for the next generations.
What is to be learnt from the past? Where do we,
Eritreans go from here? This is a new challenge in our time in search
for peace that we, Eritreans need to understand and think in a modern
way or third way of compromise. Human development changes from time to
time for different factors so as our human thinking power. One example
is that it was in no-man's expectation that Socialist Soviet Union
Republic would be divided. Therefore, Eritrea must be prepared and have
a new expectation and dimension that brings a profit of a common good
for all its people and avoid a division but work for unity. We must
accept to live in differences but at the same time we must also accept
to have a common ground in which our differences are able to
survive.
The point of conclusion is that if Dej. Tedla Bairu was
correct and self-committed to the Eritrean purpose, strong and honest in
his politics for Eritrea, and if Dej. Tedla Bairu was capable of holding
the Eritrean people together, and if Dej. Tedla Bairu was strongly
responding and opposing the Ethiopian interference in the Eritrean
internal affairs, it could be argued that there was a chance that the
Eritrean Federation Act would survive, at least, for the then ten
years as it was regulated by the UN until its right to separation for
independence probably in a peaceful way.
(R28, 1953, IX)
Consequently, there is a strong reason to argue
the probability that Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael could have a chance to
come to power for the benefit of Ethiopia, would be practically non.
Hence, it is hard to blame the straight forward political line of Bet.
Asfaha Woldemichael. Openly speaking, Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael must not
be the sole individual person for Eritreas failed politics in the
past but all those in the Eritrean leadeship including Dej. Tedla Bairu,
General Tedla Ogbit (Eritrean Police Commissioner, Federal Attorney
General and Unionist), Keshi Demetros Ghebremariam (Vice-President of
the Eritrean Assembly in 1955, Unionist and Spiritual Leader of the
Unionist Party), Bishop / Abbuna Marcus (the
Head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in Eritrea), Blatta Ephrem Medhen
(by birth Eritrean but as a youth grown in Ethiopia), the then Ethiopian
Minister for Agriculture as well as a Representative of the Ethiopian
Government at the United Nations), Dawit Ogbazghie (Unionist), Tewolde
Tedla (one of the earliest unofficial organisers of the Eritrean
Patriotic Movement), Sheik Kekkia Pasha (Massawa), Arraya Wassie,
Secretary of the Interior and Acting Chief Executive of Eritrea and so
on. Those who were at different levels of leading positions (mostly the
highlanders) be political party, religion, school, or local chief, with
the exception of few opponent Eritreans, who contributed as individuals
to strengthen the politics of Ethiopia against the will of the Eritrean
masses, must be accountable for their actions.
(R29, 1953, XXII)
In one word, Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael was an open man
in his action whereas the others were acting for Ethiopia behind the
doors. It is not novel to criticise someone without ground. Therefore,
the consideration of the next example (see Table below) will provide the
information why Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael was not alone a single
player.
The following table is a summary result of the
Commission's Analysis of Hearings of Representatives of the People of
Eritrea.
Party |
Numbers claimed By Representative at
Hearings |
% |
Membership claimed
by
Party |
Moslem League |
495,040 |
40.5% |
731,764 |
Unionist Party |
546,954 |
44.8% |
729,193 |
Liberal Progressives |
52,985 |
4.4% |
53,500 |
Pro-Italy |
113,260 |
9.2% |
219,600 |
National |
13,985 |
1.1% |
56,377 |
Total |
1,222,224 |
100% |
1,790,434 |
Total Population |
850,000 |
(R30, Four Power Report, Volume I,
1948, taken from R31, 1993)
The above table gives a clear picture of our people's
past failure of their total ambition to be united with Ethiopia instead
of their separation for total independence. This inclination was there
already before Bet. Asfaha Woldemeichael came to power. If we understand
the politics of the past in depth, then the question that comes to be
asked is: how could Bet. Asfaha Woldemichael be a scapegoat for all? The
answer is left for every Eritrean with conscience by understanding the
whole context to the end.
Similarly, from the viewpoint of a leadership role,
this is exactly what is happening today in current Eritrea. Today, the
Government of Eritrea and its people are suffering under the dictatorial
leadership of President Issaias Afeworki since 1991. But President
Issaias Afowerki has been making very grave political mistakes since
decades being unexposed to the public. Of course, the majority of the
grass-root Tegadelti know and understand the problems of their
EPLF/PFDJ's problems of leadership, but they cannot escape from it. This
is because the leadership of Issaias Afeworki was blindly supported and
followed by his comrades, including those who are known today as G15
- the Reformers, again for decades. But since our natural and social
world is in a continuous change (although we may not always be aware of
any change), the Reformers finally realised their obligation and
came determined to go for a change by calling on the Government of
President Issaias to stop his show of shame and game. For this action,
NG89E credits the Reformers with positive as well.
However, in a free democracy, individuals, groups,
communities, parties have different beliefs and political views as well
as reflections and analysis. No one should or must have the same opinion
since we are environmentally different. Hence it is improper to come to
say: how can being an Eritrean be of the view of an Ethiopian or vice
versa. Such views or understanding is not right. Someone must ask a
question to himself / herself: Why is the person so? Where is the person
grown up? What is the education of the person? What is the experience of
the person? What is the culture of the person? What is the attitude of
the person and so on? Right today, we have a number of evidences to say
so. For example, if we take the mentality of the Eritreans born and
grown up in Europe, America and so on. we find that it is quite
different from those inside Eritrea. For those outside Eritrea, Eritrea
is more or less like a tale story or cinema entertainment. That means
there is no guarantee that these Eritreans born and grown up somewhere
else outside Eritrea would advocate for Eritrea. For us, this is the
bottom line that we need to understand today.
On the account of the above different scenarios of
leadership and its links to many issues as already discussed, it seems
now important to consider the view of Herui Tedla Bairu followed by the
question: how Herui Tedla Bairu dare to say that his Father is his
model? Herui Tedla Bairu answered this as one of many other questions
when asked in an interview. Awate conducted that interview in the
Box as following:
Awate: Question: Who is your hero? Who did you look up to
as a young person? Why?
Herui Tedla: Response: "Hmmm. Am I
allowed to name my father as a hero? I consider my father my hero.
Then my hero is my father. Absolutely.
(An extract taken
from the Awate Web Site: Interview with Herui T. Bairu 1/1/2001,
Part 1, by Saleh AA Younis, October 28 2002).
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NG89E assesses the above extract out of Herui's
interview with Awate to investigate and analyse what it may mean in its
connection to his father Dej. Tedla Bairu. Out of the study of his
father's personality and leadership, NG89E has a reservation of whether
Herui T. Bairu's expression taking his father as a hero model is right.
For NG89E, it is far from the point to see a role model. NG89E believes
that Herui is mistaken to give that view because he fails to realise his
father's open ambition to grab Eritrea for the love of power. Herui, a
highly respected person and experienced politician can now hardly gain a
political profit from his subjective expression. With such perception of
world - view and especially of his Eritrea's world, still Herui does not
seem to be mature in scoring a political quality. This does neither
reflect a true and honest politician's personality nor represent a
scholarly or an educationalist view.
The question is: does Herui really know the history of
his own father and Eritrean politics when he claimed to be a politician?
This leads to a doubt of his personality for those Eritreans who know
the history and leadership of Dej. Tedla Bairu in Eritrea. However,
there is one scientific version that needs consideration. And this is
the case of heredity and the case of logic, the science of reasoning.
Hereditary, the intention of mental thinking and mental make up is a
biological process that Herui could be his father, Dej. Tedla Bairu.
However, from the standpoint of environmental factors, Herui can be
moulded differently. Consequently, from the viewpoint of logic alone, it
is not always right to prove and describe someone's behaviour and to
discredit a person's qualifications. With this it is meant, Herui Tedla
may or may not be like his father to favour Ethiopia, but this remains
to be seen with the next development of the new Eritrean Alliance
activities of his leadership. But one fact must be kept on hold. That is
to put him in the spotlight including all his partners involved in the
Alliance Leading Body for their past and present history under the
scrutiny:
- Abdella Idris (Chairman)
- Mohammad Saleh Shengeb (Vice General Secretary)
- Mohammad Osman Abubaker (Foreign Relation)
- Querenius Osman (Military Chief)
- Abdela Mahmud (Secretary)
- Hassan Ali Assad (Propaganda Chief)
- Nebil Ibrahim Ferej (Finance)
- Hamid Saleh Turki (Political Affairs).
One last point to make, in this part, is that about our
traditional mentality (the way we think is the way we behave). This
remarkable attitude is not only realised by our- selves as our weak
point, but also observed and documented by a variety of foreign
literature and foreign observers of our society. One example is that
what Gerald K.N. Trevaskis', an acting Chief Secretary in British
Administration for Eritrea, has to say in portraying the Eritrean
behaviour during the 1940s and 1950s.
"Throughout the Italian
regime the Eritrean remained content, docile and obedient to his rulers"
(R32, 1960).
Even though this assertion is true and still pains our
heart, it must be stressed that such traditional thinking is today dying
out radically. Having said that it is the strongest view of the NG89E
that we Eritreans are no more bound by the old instinct of subservience
to the leader under the belief of 'no matter whatever the sun is, is
our sun; whoever the king is, is our king'. In Tigrigna: .
Currently, there are four indicators of proof for this statement.
Firstly, the creation of EPLF-DP and its building up as an opposition
power against the GoE, despite the fact it is a split-sister of the EPLF
by its nature. This split-sister has a long way to prove its immunity
and sincerity to Eritrea since we know what the EPLF/PFDJ was and is.
Secondly, the formation of different Eritrean human organisations
throughout the world demonstrating a network of co-operation, is a
progressive movement. Thirdly, the unity of the ELF fractions as an
opposition political party, is again a sign of development. It is hoped
that this development of the ELF will be the beginning to bear unity
after more than two decades of disintegration. Fourthly, the appearance
of many individual independent democrats, those who devote their times
and interest in contributing constructive views for the sake of Eritrea,
is a significant remark of breaking the chain of silence in Eritrea.
But on the contrary to all the above given examples of
developing phenomena, there is yet another assertion that needs
recognition of our setback even today in our modern time. This assertion
is to witness that we Eritreans are still bound by the unforgettable
contribution of wisdom of Atto (Abbona:
) Welde-Ab Woldemariam: "we agree to disagree" .
This old statement can be demonstrated with two examples out of the
many.
Example One
Let us take the current conflict between the new
Alliance and ELF-RC into account. Of course, their conflict is not
without anything but political strategy. It cannot be underestimated or
overestimated. One of the key reasons of the conflict is the nature of
the leadership of the ENA and its impact on power. The issue of power
and leadership is the core content of this writing as clearly stated at
the beginning and throughout the writing. There is no need to raise it
here, because the issue of leadership quality is well addressed. But in
one word, the leadership quality of both leaders of the Alliance and the
ELF-RC, in the view of NG89E, is still a concern of their eligibility
for the people of Eritrea. As to the ELF-RC claim, the new Alliance
(ENA) headed by Herui Tedla Bairu and Abdella Idris is not clean in its
organisation. This mistake of the new Alliance has become already
evident in its decision of excluding its sister ELF-RC on October 25
2002 (R33, 2002 and R34, 27.10.2002), instead of taking an initiative
for democratic table negotiation to be able to look at the root of their
problems. If the claim is true, then the ELF-RC is in the right
position, when it shares its warning to all Eritreans and when it
declares its stand that it is firmly against any kind of foreign
influence and interference in the politics of Eritrea. To this end, it
is wise to count our old sayings in Tigrigna:
In the light of these, NG89E, on its part, accepts such
an early warning as reasonable, because the decision-maker must be the
Eritrean people themselves. NG89E believes that any political party in
Eritrea must have the full support and recognition of its own people as
it was evidently seen during the 30-year war for independence. Neither
Herui Tedla Bairu (ENA) nor Seyoum Ogbamichael (ELF-RC) has got this
security and approval from the Eritrean public. There is no single sign
of this importance that can be presented to the public from either side.
Without this, the result is only a cycle of failure, and a reason and a
means of self-invitation for the germination of another and/or the same
foreign invaders. This will be a fight again against a forced occupation
for the next generation. A precipitate marriage can end with
self-destruction. That is why the above Tigrigna sayings are
trying to explain to avoid problems.
Example Two
The second example is about the behaviour of the
minority remnants of President Issaias Afeworki, those who are poised
with lies such as Germa Asmerom (Eritrea's Ambassador to
America), Yemane Ghebremeskel (Eritrea's Government Advisor),
Yemane Ghebreab (Presidential spokesman) and their alike those
who are mostly found in the diaspora. Their stand is versus the need of
the Eritrean masses, the majority. Their contribution is two-fold. On
the one hand, it is damage for the unity of our people, and death for
themselves on the other hand. Nevertheless and whatsoever, they do, the
tempo to accelerate the course of change for the better can only be
delayed but not hindered from its success of achieving the highest and
desirable stage of common pleasure.
However, this way or another, it must be clearly
admitted that it is a natural process to live in contradiction. But the
difference is that, it is not like the case of difference in Eritrea.
Eritrea's case of agreement and disagreement has been playing for
generations. This play seems to be far from nature's reality. There is
no evidence of concrete scientific foundation presented to our people to
draw a line of difference to set a nation apart. The above 'Example Two'
can again be well considered. The supporters of President Issaias
Afeworki are, in fact, themselves part of the suppressed society. Their
today's deliberate action against their people will tomorrow be their
own burden. But they don't seem to weigh this. It is all a matter of
analytical understanding and self-awareness of a situation.
As a consequence, NG89E is the opinion that we
Eritreans (particularly, the present generation) are loaded by the state
of 'emotion culture' rather than governed by 'intelligence'
and 'critical thinking' in our ability to understand our own
world and to make a future plan when encountered to solving a
problem.
Now, it seems that the time is ripe and that it has
come to resolve the barriers of our unity. Therefore, it is to predict
that Eritrea's issues of development and prosperity, war and peace,
agreement or disagreement on common national subjects and interests,
will totally hinge on what and how the different political and social
bodies function and happen to each other as well as on their development
of new modes of thinking. The expectation is that ENA, EPLF-DP, Eritrean
Human Organisations, Religious Institutions, Independent Democrats, and
other concerned individuals regardless of their strengths or weaknesses,
must work together to prove the opposite of Abbona's older
asserted view. As a result, it is wise to note the golden meaning of the
British philosopher, John Ruskin impressive speech: "When we think,
let us think we build the future".
In considering Eritrea's multi-problems and coming to
closure of this writing, the historian Eritrean scholar, Tekeste Negash
(PhD) came out with the conclusion of a remarkable and reflective
argument when he investigated the case of Federation in his study
as following:
" …… As regards the federation the author
(Tekeste Negash) argues that it was abolished by Eritrean social and
political forces rather than by Ethiopia. The UN imposed federation and
its accompanying constitution were doomed to fail, as these were foreign
to Eritrean and Ethiopian conceptions of political power. The attempts
of the Eritrean Moslem League to defend and maintain the federation were
frustrated by internal contradictions, by the Unionist Party and by
misconstrued perceptions of the division of powers between Eritrea and
Ethiopia" (R35, 1997).
After careful consideration of all the available
literature and narrative reports, NG89E comes to the same view, even
though NG89E does not ignore the intention of the Four Powers on Eritrea
when considering the following statement as their driving and
influencing motive to the disadvantage of Eritrea:
"The future
disposal of Eritrea and of the other Colonies was many times discussed
by the Council of Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, Russia and the
United States. Unfortunately, the ministers were unwilling to consider
the future of the former Colonies solely in relation to the welfare of
their inhabitants, without regard to the supposed interests of European
powers" (R36, 1952, p. 11).
However, it is worth to remember the declaration of the
position of the U.S.S.R. as a member of the UN - Four Power in relation
to the situation in Eritrea in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations. Mr. Arutiunian, of the U.S.S.R.,
rejected the idea of 'Federation' observing that Eritrea had been "the
object of colonial exploitation and bore the yoke of colonial slavery".
Further, "the Soviet Union proposed the immediate independence of the
territory and the withdrawal of British forces" (R37, November 13,
1950).
What does the Charter of the United Nations contain
with regard to the Resolution on Eritrea? It is worth to follow and look
at it as summarised and quoted in R38, 1953, pp. 253-254 and R39, 1980,
p. 39 as following:
"Taking into consideration (a) the wishes
and welfare of the inhabitants of Eritrea, including the views of the
various racial, religious and political groups of the provinces of the
territory and the capacity of the people for self-government; (b) the
interests of peace and security in East Africa; (c) the rights and
claims of Ethiopia based on geographical, historical, ethnic or economic
reasons, including in particular Ethiopia's legitimate need for adequate
access to the sea ….. Desiring that this association (of Eritrea with
Ethiopia) assures to the inhabitants of Eritrea the fullest respect and
safeguards for their institutions, traditions, religions and languages,
as well as the widest possible measure of self-government ……" (U.N.O.
Resolution for Ethiopian-Eritrean Federal Union).
"Any failure to
settle the Eritrean question on lines other than those demanded by its
inhabitants, would demonstrate that the elements of disinterestedness
and objectivity, as well as determination to lay the basis for peace and
security in East Africa, which were the reasons for sending the question
to the General Assembly…." (R40, Ethiopia's Foreign Minister, Ato Aklilu
Habte Wold, November 3, 1950).
The above exploiting argument was Ethiopia's position
delivered to the Interim Committee of the United Nations. Ethiopia tried
to take the decision in its hand by manoeuvring the Eritrean single
largest Unionist Party, and by exploiting the other different political
and social parties to its own advantage.
It is also notable to stress that "the Four Great
Powers could only make recommendations as a solution and had no
continuing jurisdiction over Eritrea, since the U.N. Resolution required
that both parties (Eritrea and Ethiopia) must give their assent, the
principle of self-determination was accepted. But to assert that these
parties might not, by agreement, effect any necessary amendment to the
Federal Act or the Eritrean Constitution, but must accept at all times
the veto of the United Nations, would be a violation of that same
principle. No settlement or adjustment of a settlement could have any
moral or legal values unless freely arrived at by the people directly
concerned " (R41, Preparing the Draft Resolution by the UN General
Assembly).
This above entailing UN-Charter message openly
demonstrates that our people had their moral and legal right to defend
their case against the Ethiopia's desire, but failed to exploit and use
our right 'Right'. On the contrary, the leadership of Eritrea did not
use its given power and right to think for the future but contributed to
create conditions for their own loss by satisfying Ethiopia's need. This
was highlighted by the message addressed by Dej. Tedla Bairu, Chief
Executive to the public on the occasion of the Charter of the Untied
Nations Resolution on the Federal Act and on the ratification of the
Eritrean Constitution by both parties. That 50-year old message of the
Chief Executive for us today is certainly painful but for our people
those days different as discussed before. And here is the message cited
in R42, 1953, p. 283.
Ato Tedla Bairou, the Unionist leader
now Chief Executive of Eritrea, declared:
"Today we see the happy
conclusion of the 67th year of our struggle. The re-birth of Eritrea
testifies to the glory and greatness of Ethiopia. It is not necessary to
elaborate the fact that Your Majesty and the Ethiopian Government
struggled effectively to bring about this end. This I will leave to the
pages of history. It is my duty to inform Your Majesty of the will of
the Eritrean people to accept the Federal Act proposed by the United
nations" (Speech of Dej. Tedla Bairu, September 11, 1952).
Eritrea's ups and downs are further explained with the
British documentary protocols of 1955. Two examples of the Foreign
Office are presented as follows:
Example 1
"The fall of
Tedla Bairu, and his succession by Asfaha Woldemichael, was due to a
combination of arrogance and over-confidence on the part of Tedla,
slowness by the members of the Assembly to grasp a situation which they
themselves had created, and a not unexpected quickness on the part of
the local Ethiopian Representatives to take advantage of the changed
circumstances. Since his election as Chief Executive in September, 1952,
Tedla Bairu had treated the Assembly with increasing off-handedness; he
seldom appeared at its meetings, and the Secretaries of the Executive
Departments frequently failed to turn when important bills regarding
their Departments were being discussed. In addition, ugly rumours of
nepotism and personal corruption on the part of Tedla himself had gained
wide currency. The Deputies chose to attack the Chief Executive through
Ali Radai, the President of the Assembly and in June, in face of an
attempt by his opponents to pass a vote of "no confidence" in the
President, Tedla Bairu suspended the Assembly for 20 days, an action
which, in certain circumstances, is permitted by the Eritrean
Constitution. At the end of this period Tedla ordered a further 20 days
suspension; suddenly realising that a real danger to his position
existed, Tedla now began a feverish campaign of self-justification,
including newspaper interviews, personal visits to provincial towns and
a published speech in one of Asmara's largest cinemas. But by this time,
it was too late. His opponents had appealed to the Emperor, through his
Imperial Majesty's Representative in Asmara, against the Chief
Executive's actions and the Emperor let it be known that he considered
the suspension illegal. While it appears that under the Constitution
this action, however, unwise, was in fact permissible, it was now clear
that the highest Ethiopian Authorities were no longer prepared to give
Tedla bairu their Support. Tedal accordingly resigned, and left for
Addis Ababa, where he now lives in a villa outside the town, reputedly
financially assisted by the Emperor himself" (R43, British Foreign
Office: Eritrea Annual Review 1955).
Example 2
"It would be a mistake to regard
Tedla Bairu as a martyr on behalf of Eritrean independence. He had
himself long been identified with the Unionist Party and, although he
may since have attempted to justify himself with the Federalist, in
order to strengthen his internal position within Eritrea itself, it does
not appear that this was the cause of his rejection by the Ethiopians.
Rather, the latter seem to have come to the conclusion that because of
his growing local unpopularity, Tedla's usefulness to them was now
ended. They, therefore, seized the opportunity offered to them by the
disarray of Tedla's opponents - who, once the cause of their animosity
had actually been displaced, seemed to have no clear ideas as to whom
they wanted to replace him - to install as Chief Executive a man even
more closely bound to Unionist interests. Asfaha Woldemichael, the
former Vice-Representative of the Emperor in Eritrea, has been careful
to avoid his predecessor's mistakes, and has treated the Assembly with
some show of outward deference. While undoubtedly working for Union in
the long run, he is unlikely to make any rash or ill-considered moves in
that direction. As expected the Jubilee, (25 years since the Emperor
ascended the throne) passed off without any substantiation of the
rumours that Union might be proclaimed to mark the occasion" (R44,
British Foreign Office: Eritrea Annual Report 1955).
At this point, it is necessary to take into account the
argument and words of Abraha Tessema (the son of Ras Tessema
Asberom, Ma'eE-reba that were
more than vindicated. The one who read and knew the future of Eritrea as
a prophet and who once ran as candidate but failed for the Chief
Executive against Dej. Tedla Bairu, won the argument. Abraha Tessema's
prophecy was realised nine years later (when the uprising started in
1962), when he said:
"After annexation, the Eritrean people
will realise that they were doomed and would rise against their masters,
and civil war would ensue". Further, he said:
"The Eritreans were hopelessly divided by religion
and racial divisions. ….. Having succumbed to Ethiopian annexation at
some future time they will realise that they are once more an occupied
territory, and concluded that this might unite the Eritrean people
against the Ethiopians" (R45, Abraha Tessema, Documented as
'Confidential' by the British Consulate Asmara to Foreign Office,
London, 24.12. 1953).
(R46, 2000, p.
419)
Therefore, in conclusion, by weighing the importance of
the affecting causes and matters from A to Z, it is we, ourselves the
primary cause for the consequences, who acted to happen on behalf, to be
blamed more than Ethiopia did to us so as Great Britain and the USA.
NG89E has never been for Ethiopia and never shall to be, when 'a
State seeks to enslave another State'. But NG89E understands why
Ethiopia is interested in Eritrea for its economy and political strategy
of Ethiopia. Therefore, for all evil measures Ethiopia has undertaken
against Eritrea is understandable but also regrettable and condemning.
Having stressed this, in the final analysis, our people influenced by
our own Eritrean leaders must have taken a collective responsibility for
their total failure in the past and present, despite the fact of the
leadership role is the primary. Where there is unity, there is strength.
Where there is strength and unity, there is one voice.
In considering this, NG89E provides three further Eritrean proverbs in
Tigrina, for they have a close meaning to each other, to describe the
causal relationship of our politics and behaviour in its conclusion of
today's writing. :: At this point, it is important to criticise the ELF
and EPLF/PDFJ for their poor political analysis in the past and present.
This is because both have failed to tell the truth in their lessons. But
for their public political gain, they were sharp to tell us about the
West and East to put us in their possession. All their stories of the
West and East were secondary to the Eritrean main cause of failure.
This is all more or less a dead story but a lesson.
Following and understanding the whole context together from the
beginning to the end, it is the strongest advice of NG89E to the
Eritrean people, not to hasten to judge but to reflect. In our
judgement, we must not only look at the end of the means but also at the
means to the end to see the context of its cause and effect so that to
understand all the problems associated with the leadership, leader and
the led. Otherwise, we will not have a real future until we know that we
have a real past. Eritrea needs us and we need Eritrea.
Wishing Merry Christmas - Year 2002 and Happy New
Year 2003
Victory to the Eritrean Masses
Negaritt-Gazette 89E
Rora Habab,
contributed and has sole responsibility for the content on this
page. For comments you can contact the writer by e-mail: Rora Habab
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